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From April 2004, a set of Government policies designed to help lone parents into
work have been piloted in various combinations in a number of Jobcentre Plus
districts in Great Britain. The five policies are: In Work Credit (IWC), Work Search
Premium (WSP), Extended Schools Childcare (ESC) and Childcare Tasters, Quarterly
Work Focused Interviews (QWFIs) for lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12
or over in Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating
(ESQWFI), and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP), hereafter collectively
referred to as ‘the lone parent pilots’ (LPPs or ‘the pilots’). The pilots were rolled out
in four Phases, the first three of which are analysed in this report.
This report estimates the impact of the LPPs on lone parents who have received
Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months. It uses a
difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator, and makes use of lone parents in districts
not operating a pilot as a comparison group. The data covers the first 12 months
(Phase 3 districts) to the first 24 months (Phase 1 districts) of the pilots’ operation,
and so should be seen as giving the early impacts. Impacts were estimated separately
for the stock of lone parents who had been on benefit for at least 12 months when
the pilots began, and the flow sample of lone parents whose claim of IS/JSA reached
12 months after the pilots began.
Key findings
• Before the pilots began, the districts operating the lone parent pilots had, on
average, worse labour market outcomes for lone parents than those not operating
the pilots.
• The pilots had small, positive impacts on the number of lone parents in work
and no longer receiving out-of-work benefits. After 12 months of being potentially
eligible to the pilots, the central estimate implies that the lone parent pilots led
to around 900 more lone parents not being on benefits (around 800 from the
stock sample, and around 100 from the flow sample). Measured after 12 months
of being potentially eligible to the pilots, these impacts correspond to 0.6 per
cent and 0.2 per cent of all lone parents on benefit for at least 12 months in the
stock and flow sample respectively, rising to 1.2 per cent after 24 months for the
stock sample in the Phase 1 districts.
2 Summary
• In the absence of the pilots, lone parents on IS/JSA for at least 12 months tended
to stay on benefits for long durations. The central estimate implies that the pilots
increased the number of lone parents no longer receiving out-of-work benefits
by 1.6 per cent for the flow sample, and by 4.1 per cent for the stock sample
after 12 months of being eligible to the pilots. After two years of the pilot’s
operation in the Phase 1 districts, the pilots increased the number of lone parents
in the stock sample no longer receiving out-of-work benefits by seven per cent.
• Participation in IWC – the number of lone parents who have ever received IWC
as a fraction of those ever potentially eligible – increased continuously in all
districts. This is consistent with the estimates from the stock sample that the
impact of the pilots did increase up to 31 March 2006, and suggests that their
impact may continue to increase after that point.
• There is some evidence that the impact of the pilots was greater amongst lone
parents who had a history of participation in New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP)
than those who did not. This could be because these lone parents were more
likely to know about IWC, or because they naturally tended to be a group more
responsive to financial incentives to work. There was a general tendency for the
impact of the LPPs on benefit outcomes to rise with the age of youngest child.
There was no consistent variation according to the quarter in which a lone parent
became potentially eligible to the LPPs, nor by the number of children.
• As a whole, the evidence in this report suggests that, in its first one to two years
of operation, the main achievement of the pilots was to make better off those
lone parents who would have left benefits for work had the pilots not been in
operation, rather than to encourage substantially more lone parents to do just
that. The pilots may be encouraging job retention amongst this group, but it
was not possible to examine this in this report.
• The fact that the positive response to the lone parent pilots is concentrated
amongst those lone parents who had a history of participation in NDLP suggests
– but does not prove – that the small impact of the pilots might be due to a lack
of knowledge of IWC amongst those lone parents who have not yet decided to
look for work; separately-commissioned qualitative research on both the pilots
and ND+fLP should be informative about this.
• Both participation in IWC and the impact of the lone parent pilots on the stock
sample increased over time, and so equivalent impact estimates in future reports
(due to be published in late 2008) may be higher than those presented here. On
the other hand, the impact of IWC on lone parents might fall after individuals
reach the 12 month time-limit for payments. Given that very few of the lone
parents who have received IWC will have received it long enough to reach that
time-limit in the period covered by the data used in this report, it is possible that
the estimates of the impact of the pilots assessed over longer periods in
subsequent reports could be lower than those impacts assessed over 12 to 24
months provided here. It is therefore unclear, a priori, whether future impact
estimates will be higher or lower than those found in this report.
3Summary
This is the first published report from a project designed to evaluate quantitatively
the labour market impact of a set of government policies designed to help lone
parents into work. These policies are being piloted in different combinations in
Jobcentre Plus districts in Great Britain. The five policies in question are: IWC, WSP,
ESC, ESQWFI, and ND+fLP. These are collectively referred to as the LPPs. In practice,
the impact of these policies will be dominated by the impact of IWC.
The pilots were introduced in four phases (April 2004, October 2004, April 2005 and
October 2005), the first three of which are analysed in this report. Data limitations
mean that the analysis is restricted to English districts. There are separately-
commissioned qualitative evaluations of the lone parent pilots and of ND+fLP, both
due to be published in March 2007.
Methodology
The evaluation aims to estimate the impact of the LPPs on various labour market
outcomes for lone parents on IS or JSA who live in the pilot districts. This report
provides short-run estimates of the early impact of the pilots using data from the first
two years of operation of the pilots in Phase 1, 18 months in Phase 2 and 12 months
in Phase 3.
Information concerning who actually participated in the LPPs was also unavailable to
researchers in time for this report, thus the impact estimated herein is that of being
potentially eligible for the LPPs (corresponding to estimating the impact of the
‘intention to treat’ of the LPPs).
The report uses a DiD estimator to estimate the impact of the LPPs. This involves
comparing the trend in labour market outcomes for lone parents in the pilot districts
with the trend in labour market outcomes for lone parents in a set of comparison
districts (see Box 1). The lone parents in the comparison districts are acting as a guide
to the trend in outcomes that would have been experienced by those in the pilot
districts had there been no pilots. The comparison districts were chosen to be all
English districts operating neither a LPP nor the Employment Retention and
Advancement (ERA) programme. Because outcomes for lone parents in the pilot
districts tended to be worse than for those in the comparison districts, the pilots
would be deemed to be having a positive impact if there was a convergence in
labour market outcomes between the pilot and comparison districts.
Summary
4Box 1 The DiD estimators
An alternative way of describing the DiD estimator is shown in the Table below.
Before policy After policy
Comparison Pilot Comparison Pilot
districts districts districts districts
Lone parents B0 A0 B1 A1
If the Letters A and B refer to the mean (average) outcome for the group in
question, having controlled for differences in observable characteristics, then
the DiD estimator is given by (A1 – A0) – (B1 – B0). This is the trend in the pilot
districts less the trend in the comparison districts.
In practice, this assessment is made after controlling for a wide range of factors
which might also affect labour market outcomes. This evaluation used administrative
data held by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) – the Work and Pensions
Longitudinal Study (WPLS), the Income Support History file (IS History file), and the
National Benefits Database (NBD) – that provided information on benefit receipt up
to 31 March 2006, and employment information up to 30 September 2005. A large
number of individual and local-area characteristics that affect labour market
outcomes were included in the final dataset, including detailed work and benefit
outcomes for the 30 months before lone parents became potentially eligible for the
lone parent pilots, personal characteristics recorded in the administrative data-sets,
and local-area data from a variety of sources, including the 2001 Census and Office
for Standards in Education (Ofsted) data on registered childminders. Because some
of this local-area data is available in different forms across the UK, this report looks
only at English districts (and therefore does not estimate the impact of the pilots in
Edinburgh or Cardiff).
The decision to use a DiD estimator was taken after testing whether lone parents in
comparison districts would act as a good guide to the level of labour market
outcomes of lone parents in the pilot districts in the absence of the pilots (sometimes
known as a pre-programme test, or a test for unobservable differences). It was
found that lone parents in comparison districts had better labour market outcomes
than lone parents in the pilot districts even after controlling for a wide range of
factors; provided this difference does not change over time, however, a DiD
estimator can still give a reliable guide to the impact of the pilots.
Summary
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The sample for analysis potentially consisted of all lone parents in England whose
claim for IS/JSA exceeded 12 months at some point between 1 April 2002 and
30 September 2005. This sample was split into the pilot and comparison districts, as
described above, and into two further groups:
• The stock sample: includes all IS/JSA claims being made by lone parents living
in one of the pilot districts whose duration equals or exceeds 12 months at the
point at which the LPPs began: these claims were potentially affected by the
pilots from the day they were introduced.
• The flow sample: includes all IS/JSA claims being made by lone parents living in
one of the pilot districts whose duration equals or exceeds 12 months at some
point between 1 April 2004 and 30 September 2005 (the ‘inflow window’).
The more interesting estimates are those of the impact on the flow sample, because
that determines how effective the pilots will be in the long-run: in the long-run,
everyone in the initial stock sample will have stopped claiming benefits, and so the
only lone parents potentially eligible to the pilots will be those whose claim of IS/JSA
reached 12 months after the introduction of the LPPs. However, the larger sample
size of the stock sample means that impacts are estimated more accurately for these
groups.
The employment records in the WPLS are based on employers’ returns to Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) about individuals they are employing who
are earning enough to be liable for Income Tax or National Insurance. This means
that it may not include individuals who are in work, but earning below the personal
threshold (although the received wisdom is that many, mainly large, employers do
report such spells of work), nor other spells of work that have not been declared to
HMRC. For this reason, the data may underestimate the amount of time spent in
work. However, the way in which uncertain start and end dates are recorded may
lead to an overestimate of the amount of time spent in work if all dates in the WPLS
are taken at face value. For example, on the date that individuals first become
eligible for the LPPs, between 11 per cent (of the stock) and 21 per cent (of the flow)
are recorded as being in work. Although it is possible to be both in work and
receiving IS, this proportion seems rather high. This means that the measure of work
in the WPLS may not be a reliable guide to whether a given individual is actually
working. On the other hand, the results of this evaluation suggest that changes over
time in the measure of work look more plausible.
Lone parents in pilot districts are slower to leave benefits and spend less time in work
than those in comparison districts. Lone parents in the flow sample leave benefits
more quickly and spend more time in work than those in the stock sample.
Summary
6Participation in In Work Credit
Data on which lone parents received IWC was not available for this report, but
information on the total number of claims of IWC by month and by district were
available, up to November 2005. It was therefore possible to estimate take-up of
IWC, or participation in IWC. However, limitations of the measure of work in the
WPLS meant that it was impossible to estimate accurately the number of lone
parents who met all the conditions for receiving IWC (ie, who had been on benefits
for at least 12 months and then left benefit for a job): a measure of take-up using this
definition of eligibility exceeded 100 per cent, presumably because some lone
parents had genuinely met the conditions for receiving IWC, but this was not being
reflected in the WPLS.
However, it was possible to estimate accurately a broader measure of participation
in IWC: the number of lone parents who have received IWC as a proportion of those
who have ever been potentially eligible (ie, who have been on benefits for at least 12
months and live in a pilot district). By November 2005, this measure had reached
four per cent in the Phase 3 districts, eight per cent in the Phase 2 districts, and nine
per cent in the Phase 1 districts. The measure – which should be stable in a long-run
equilibrium – rose over time in all three Phases, and was continuing to rise in the
Phase 1 districts even after 20 months of operation. This suggests that IWC was not
operating at its full potential by November 2005, perhaps reflecting delays in lone
parents discovering that they are potentially eligible for IWC, or delays in the ability
of Jobcentre Plus staff to market IWC effectively: the data here cannot distinguish
between these or alternative explanations. Because this participation rate provides a
theoretical upper bound to the impact of the IWC, this result also suggests that the
impact of IWC may also be rising over time.
There was also variation in this participation rate across the Phases, with Phase 1
having lower participation rates than Phases 2 and 3 (although participation data
was available only to November 2005, covering only the first nine months in the
Phase 3 districts). It is not simple to interpret this finding: it could reflect differences
in local labour markets, differences in the characteristics of lone parents in the
districts in the various Phases, or differential performance of Jobcentre Plus staff in
marketing IWC.
Difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the lone
parent pilots
Estimates are provided of the impact of the pilots on the proportion of lone parents
who have stopped claiming benefits, and on the proportion of lone parents who are
in work, at three-monthly intervals following the date on which they first became
potentially eligible for the LPPs. Estimates are made separately for the flow and stock
sample, and separately for each Phase (and for the flow sample, for all three Phases
together).
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7The estimates suggest that, on average, the pilots had small, positive impacts on
both work and benefit outcomes. For the stock sample, an average of 0.6
percentage point (ppts) more of potentially eligible lone parents had left benefit
after 12 months of being potentially eligible to the lone parent pilots, rising to 1.20
ppts after 24 months in the Phase 1 districts; between 0.26 and 1.11 ppts of
potentially eligible lone parents more are in work six months after the introduction
of the LPPs. After 12 months exposure to the pilots, 0.24 ppts more of potentially
eligible lone parents from the flow sample have left benefit and 0.28 ppts more are
in work, but neither of these numbers are statistically significant from zero.
In the absence of the pilots, lone parents on IS/JSA for at least 12 months tend to stay
on benefits for long durations, and this helps explain why these estimated impacts
seem small. Of the 38,560 lone parents in the flow sample, 5,861 (15.2 per cent)
were not receiving out-of-work benefits a year after first becoming eligible. The
central estimate is that the lone parent pilots were responsible for just under a
hundred (93) of these lone parents. Of the 191,369 lone parents in the stock sample,
around 19,500 (10.2 per cent) were no longer receiving out-of-work benefits a year
later, and the central estimate is that the lone parent pilots were responsible for
around 800 of these. After 24 months of operation of the pilots in the Phase 1
districts, 7,245 of the 42,374 lone parents in the stock sample and potentially
eligible to the lone parent pilots were no longer on out-of-work benefits, and the
central estimate is that the lone parent pilots are directly responsible for 508 of
those. This implies, therefore, that after 12 months of being eligible to the lone
parent pilots, the number of lone parents not on benefit had increased by 4.1 per
cent for the stock sample and 1.6 per cent for the flow sample, although the latter is
not statistically significant from zero. After 24 months, the number in the stock
sample and not on benefit in the Phase 1 districts had increased by seven per cent.
Estimates from the stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots increased over
time, consistent with estimates of the proportion of potentially eligible lone parents
who have ever received IWC. This pattern was not evident in the flow sample,
although this may be because the flow sample was too small to observe such an
effect at this stage.
Estimates from the stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots is greater for
Phase 3 districts than it is for Phase 1 or Phase 2 districts; estimates from the flow
sample provide weak evidence that the impact of the pilots is greater for Phase 2
districts than it is for Phase 1 or Phase 3 districts. These differences exist after the
analysis has controlled for many characteristics of the local areas and lone parents in
the different Phases, but this variation between Phases may reflect differences that
have not been adequately controlled for. But the differences are small, and not
always statistically significant. There is weak evidence that the impacts are slightly
greater in districts which do not operate ND+fLP, but this difference is only apparent
in the stock sample, is derived from data from the first 12 months of operation of
ND+fLP combined with the six to 12 months before that, and is very small in
magnitude.
Summary
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some history of participation in NDLP. Because NDLP is a voluntary programme, it
might be expected that those lone parents who join it are those who are more likely
to leave benefit and enter work so those lone parents who are naturally predisposed
to respond to financial incentives may be the ones that join NDLP, and therefore any
positive impact of IWC on all lone parents’ outcomes is concentrated amongst this
group. In addition, it may be that those lone parents with a recent history of NDLP
participation are more likely to have heard about IWC before they found a job
through meetings with their personal adviser, so these differences may reflect
informational effects. There is also weak evidence that the impacts are slightly
greater for female lone parents, and for lone parents whose youngest child is
relatively older.
Table 1 summarises the main impact estimates.
Table 1 Summary of impacts of the lone parent pilots
(all in percentage points)
Benefit outcomes Work outcomes
Stock sample After 12 months After six months
Phase 1 2 3 1 2 3
Overall 0.51** 0.25 1.20*** 0.26 0.34** 1.11***
ND+fLP 0.51** -0.33 N/A 0.26 -0.16 N/A
Non-ND+fLP N/A 0.42** 1.20*** N/A 0.51*** 1.11***
NDLP participation
None 0.40 0.15 1.07*** 0.27 0.35** 1.03***
Recent -0.49 0.89 3.10*** -2.43*** 0.31 2.57***
Past 1.97 0.85 1.87** 1.00 0.11 1.04*
Female 0.59** 0.31 1.24*** 0.26 0.39*** 1.16***
Male -0.70 -0.87 0.84 0.21 -0.43 0.37
Age of youngest child
0-1 -0.98 -0.57 0.93 0.41 0.31 0.68
1-3 0.81 -0.20 0.51 0.57 0.65 0.37
3-4 0.91 0.09 0.60 -0.20 -0.03 1.77***
5-8 0.24 0.12 1.14*** 1.11** 0.75 0.95***
8-11 0.14 0.39 1.57*** -0.56 0.40 0.97***




Benefit outcomes Work outcomes
Flow sample After 12 months After six months
Overall 0.24 0.28
Phase 1 -0.37 0.61**
Phase 2 0.73 0.35
















Notes: The table shows the central estimate of the impact of the lone parent pilots on the
proportion of lone parents no longer on benefit (or ‘now in work’) six or 12 months after first
becoming potentially eligible to the pilots. Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so
an estimate of -0.16 means -0.16 ppts, not -16ppts. * = significant at 10 per cent level,
** = significant at 5 per cent level, *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
Summary of impact assessments and policy implications
As a whole, the evidence in this report suggests that, in its first one to two years of
operation, the main achievement of the pilots was to make better off those lone
parents who would have left benefits for work had the pilots not been in operation,
rather than to encourage substantially more lone parents to do just that. The pilots
may well be encouraging job retention amongst this group, but it is not possible to
examine this in detail without data on which lone parents received IWC (due for the
later reports – see below).
The fact that the positive response to the lone parent pilots is concentrated amongst
those lone parents who had a history of participation in NDLP suggests – but by no
means proves – that the small impact of the pilots might be due to a lack of
knowledge of IWC amongst those lone parents who have not yet decided to look for
work; separately-commissioned qualitative research on both the pilots and ND+fLP
should be informative about this.
Summary
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Both participation in IWC and the impact of the lone parent pilots increased over
time, and so equivalent impact estimates in future reports may well be higher than
those presented here. On the other hand, the impact of IWC on individual lone
parents might be expected to fall after the 12 month time-limit for payments has
been reached. Given that few of the lone parents who have ever received IWC will
have received it long enough to reach that time-limit in the period covered by the
data used in this report, it is therefore possible that the estimates of the impact of the
pilots assessed over longer periods in subsequent reports could be lower than those
provided here when assessed over 12 to 24 months. It is therefore unclear, a priori,
whether future impact estimates will be higher or lower than those found in this
report.
In theory, the impact of the lone parent pilots in different districts can be compared
to provide estimates of the additional impacts of various components of the lone
parent pilots (for example, this could provide an estimate of the additional impact of
WSP or of ESC compared with IWC alone). However, this report did not provide such
estimates, other than comparing ND+fLP districts with other districts. This is because
such estimates rely on comparing the estimated impacts in different districts with
each other; because the estimated impact across all districts was so low and not
always statistically significant, differences between sub-groups were even less likely
to be statistically significant from zero. The authors considered, therefore, having
seen the estimates for all areas, that it would not be meaningful to attempt to
estimate separately the impact of different combinations of policies. It will, though,
be possible to re-examine this issue in future reports; the fact that future reports will
have access to more data means that it is very likely that the estimates of the impact
of the pilots will be estimated more accurately. The estimates in this report, then, are
of the average impact of the lone parent pilots across all districts, although it is likely
that any impacts are dominated by the impact of IWC.
Future analysis
At least two further reports are planned as part of this evaluation. These reports will
have access to individual-level data detailing who actually received IWC, and so will
enable greater focus on whether the LPPs have affected job retention rates, as well
as moves off benefits and into work. They will also have access to more outcome
data, and so will be able to consider the medium- to long-run impacts of the LPPs on
lone parents in Phases 1 to 3, and the shorter-run impacts on lone parents living in
the Phase 4 pilot districts. A technical report will also investigate alternative ways of




This is the first published report from a project designed to evaluate quantitatively
the impact of a set of government policies designed to help lone parents into work.
There are five policies in total. These policies are being piloted in different
combinations in Jobcentre Plus districts in Great Britain, and have been introduced in
four phases (starting April 2004, October 2004, April 2005 and October 2005). The
five policies in question are: In Work Credit (IWC), Work Search Premium (WSP),
Extended Schools Childcare (ESC) and Childcare Tasters, Quarterly Work Focused
Interviews (QWFI) for lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 or over in Local
Education Authorities (LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating (ESQWFI), and New
Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP). Hereafter, these are collectively referred to as
the ‘lone parent pilots’ (LPPs). In practice, though, it is expected the impact of these
policies will be dominated by the impact of IWC, and so some of this report looks
exclusively at that policy.
The aim of the evaluation is to estimate the short- and long-run impact of the LPPs on
various labour market outcomes for lone parents on Income Support (IS) or
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) who live in the pilot districts. There are separately-
commissioned qualitative evaluations of the lone parent pilots and of ND+fLP, not
yet published at the time this report went to press.
This first stage report is only able to provide relatively short-run estimates of the
impact of the LPPs in Phases 1 to 3 because at the time this project was carried out,
data was only available for up to two years following the introduction of the pilots in
the earliest (Phase 1) districts, and up to only one year in Phase 3. Information
concerning who actually participated in the LPPs was also unavailable to researchers
in time for this report, thus the impact estimated herein is that of being potentially
eligible for the LPPs (this concept of being ‘potentially eligible’ is explained more fully
in Section 3 of this report, but note that in the evaluation jargon it means that this
report evaluates the ‘intention to treat‘ (ITT) of the LPPs). Future reports planned as
part of this evaluation will look at longer-run outcomes, and make full use of
administrative data on who received IWC.
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The outline of this report is as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of the policies being evaluated, including details
of their locations and timings.
• Chapter 3 describes the methodology that is used.
• Chapter 4 describes how the datasets that are used in the evaluation were
constructed.
• Chapter 5 presents impact estimates from Phases 1 to 3 of the LPPs using benefit
data up to 31 March 2006 and employment data up to 30 September 2005.
• Chapter 6 concludes and sets out next steps.
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2 The lone parent pilots:
what policies are being
evaluated?
This project aims to evaluate the impact of a number of policies designed to help or
encourage lone parents into work and/or to stop claiming benefits. These policies
are:
• In-Work Credit (IWC);
• Work Search Premium (WSP);
• Extended Schools Childcare (ESC) and Childcare Tasters;
• Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (QWFI) for lone parents in Local Education
Authorities (LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating, whose youngest child is
aged 12 or over (ESQWFI);
• New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP).
Section 2.1 provides brief details of the policies, while Section 2.2 shows how the
policies overlap spatially and temporally.
2.1 Details of the policies
2.1.1 In Work Credit
The IWC is available to lone parents who have:
• been receiving Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA, income-based
or contributory) or a combination of the two for a continuous period of 12
months or more; and
• who stop claiming benefits and move into work of at least 16 hours per week.
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It is payable at a rate of £40 per week for up to 12 months in order to ease the
transition into work, and to encourage lone parents to leave benefits for employment
(of at least 16 hours a week). Payments will stop after 12 months, or if the lone
parent stops working (breaks in employment of less than five weeks will not lead to
payments stopping), or if the lone parent claims an out-of-work benefit. Lone
parents have to provide evidence that they are still in work (or are self-employed) at
four points during this period: 10, 26, 38 and 52 weeks after taking a job. The bonus
is paid weekly in arrears. IWC payments should not lead to a reduction in
entitlements to means-tested benefits or tax credits; however, there are reports that
some Local Authorities (LAs) are incorrectly reducing Housing Benefit (HB) awards
where individuals are in receipt of IWC: this, of course, reduces or eliminates the
additional financial benefit to employment that IWC provides.
In April 2004 (Phase 1), IWC was introduced in the Jobcentre Plus districts of
Bradford, North London and South-East London. In October 2004 (Phase 2), it
became available in a further nine districts: Cardiff & Vale; Central London; Dudley
& Sandwell; Edinburgh, Lothian & Borders; Lancashire West; Leeds; Leicestershire;
Staffordshire; West London. These districts were chosen because they had relatively
poor outcomes for lone parents on benefit, and relatively high proportions of lone
parents in the population. In April 2005 (Phase 3), IWC was rolled out across the
remaining London districts (with the exception of North-East London, in which the
Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme offered similar
incentives). In October 2005 (Phase 4), IWC was extended to a further six districts in
the South East of England: Surrey & Sussex; Essex; Kent; Berkshire, Buckinghamshire
& Oxfordshire; Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire; Hampshire & the Isle of Wight. The
expansion to Phases 3 & 4 was justified on the grounds that work incentives might
be particularly poor for lone parents in London and the south-east, perhaps because
of high transport costs, or high levels of rents and council tax, which weaken work
incentives through the operation of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. After
this expansion, around 45 per cent of lone parents on benefit for at least a year will
live in districts offering IWC.1
As outlined in Chapter 1, the availability of labour market outcome data means that
this report will only consider the impact of the lone parent pilots (including IWC) in
Phase 1 to 3 districts (in which the pilots started during or prior to April 2005). The
impact of the lone parent pilots (LPPs) in the Phase 4 districts will be considered in
later reports. Further, as explained in Chapter 4, this report considers only Jobcentre
Plus districts in England.
2.1.2 Work Search Premium
Lone parents who have been on IS/JSA (or some combination) for 12 months or
more, and who are willing to join New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and engage
voluntarily in job search activity are eligible to claim a WSP payment of £20 per week
for a maximum of 26 weeks.
1 HM Treasury (2006).
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The WSP is payable to lone parents who are participants on NDLP and who agree an
action plan with their Personal Adviser (PA). They are not tied into specific job search
activities, but receipt of WSP is at the continual discretion of their PA, with whom
they will discuss job search on a fortnightly basis.
WSP operates in a number of districts in tandem with IWC: Bradford and South-East
London (Phase 1): Cardiff & Vale; Edinburgh, Lothian & Borders; Lancashire West;
Leicestershire; Dudley & Sandwell; West London (Phase 2).
In the WSP pilot districts that are not also providing services as part of the ND+fLP
pilot (Lancashire West and West London), WSP is no longer available to new clients
since the end of September 2006; however, lone parents who started receiving WSP
before this date will continue to receive it until they lose eligibility in the usual way
(i.e. after six months, or after leaving IS/JSA).
2.1.3 Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters
The ESC and Childcare Tasters pilots (jointly referred to as ESC) were introduced in
several LEAs in Great Britain, although the details vary slightly between England,
Scotland and Wales (as implementation is a devolved issue). In England (the only
districts under consideration in this report), the pilots were managed by LEAs in
order to best meet local needs, working in close cooperation with Jobcentre Plus,
schools and other stakeholders. This will inevitably mean that there will be
considerable variation in the effective treatment across locations.
ESC pilots aim to improve the availability of affordable childcare for working
parents. In England, each pilot has a Childcare Coordinator, employed by the LEA,
who works with schools to create new childcare places. Childcare Partnership
Managers from Jobcentre Plus provide the strategic link between Jobcentre Plus and
LEAs. Childcare Coordinators and Childcare Partnership Managers work with
Children’s Information Services, providing up-to-date information on local childcare
vacancies, including those in schools.
It is expected that this pilot will primarily help parents of school-age children (i.e.
children aged five to 14, 16 for children with special needs), but the LEAs’ remit also
allows them to provide childcare for younger or older children if that would help lone
parents into work. In addition, although this pilot is mainly aimed at helping lone
parents who are ready to move into employment, in practice the services will be
available to all parents in a particular LEA. Indeed, LEAs have a great deal of
discretion over how to use the money that is given to them, so the services that a
parent may receive will not be uniform between, or even within, local authorities.
The aims of the pilots are the same in Wales and Scotland, although the institutional
arrangements may be different.
ESC pilots are running from 1 April 2004 until 31 March 2006 in Bradford, Haringey
and Lewisham LEAs in England, and from 1 October 2004 to 31 March 2006 in
Leicestershire, Leicester, Greenwich and Sandwell LEAs in England, Fife and
Aberdeenshire in Scotland, and Torfaen in Wales. These LEAs also run the Childcare
Taster pilot, the aim of which is to help lone parents build trust and confidence in the
Lone parent pilots: what policies are being evaluated?
16
use of formal childcare. Childcare Tasters are also operating in some areas that are
not operating an ESC pilot, but this is ignored during the empirical work (in other
words, it was assumed that the Childcare Tasters pilot on its own would have
negligible impact on the likelihood that lone parents in that area left benefit or found
work). Some LEAs are smaller than the Jobcentre Plus districts that contain them:
Haringey LEA comprises around 40 per cent of the North London Jobcentre Plus
district, Lewisham LEA comprises around 40 per cent of the South-East London
Jobcentre Plus district, Leicestershire and Leicester LEAs between them cover the
Jobcentre Plus district of Leicestershire, Greenwich LEA covers a further 40 per cent
of the South-East London Jobcentre Plus district, and Sandwell covers 60 per cent of
the Dudley & Sandwell Jobcentre Plus district.
2.1.4 Extended Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews
In LEAs in which an ESC pilot is operating, there are mandatory Work Focused
Interviews (WFIs) at quarterly intervals for lone parents whose youngest child is aged
12 or over, and who have been on IS/JSA for 12 months or more. Where Jobcentre
Plus districts are larger than LEAs, ESQWFIs will only apply to lone parents living
within the LEA. ESQWFIs were introduced in Bradford, Lewisham and Haringey in
September 2004, and Leicester, Leicestershire, Sandwell and Greenwich in October
2004; they will end in all districts in April 2007.2
2.1.5 New Deal Plus for Lone Parents
At the end of April 2005, five Jobcentre Plus districts started offering ND+fLP in
addition to the other LPP programmes that they were operating. These Jobcentre
Plus districts were: Bradford, North London and South-East London (Phase 1);
Leicestershire and Dudley & Sandwell (Phase 2). From October 2006, Cardiff & Vale
and Edinburgh also began to offer ND+fLP services (although these districts do not
form part of this report). The ND+fLP pilots are currently due to end in March 2008.
The aim of ND+fLP is to offer a coherent package of support to lone parents, with the
pilots bringing together the main themes of the Work Focus, Work Incentives and
Childcare strategies, and building on the lessons learned from the IB Pathway pilots.
Lone parent pilots: what policies are being evaluated?
2 Lone parents claiming IS/JSA but not required to attend QWFIs are subject to
the following WFI regime: for new or repeat claims, there is an initial interview,
reviews at six and twelve months, followed by annual WFIs (i.e. at 24, 36, 48
months, etc.). For existing IS recipients, there is an initial interview, followed by
annual WFIs. WFIs have been gradually extended to the stock of lone parents in
receipt of IS/JSA through a phased rollout based on the age of the lone parent’s
youngest child. In practice, this means that lone parents eligible for QWFIs
should receive WFIs six, 12, 15, 18, 21 (etc.) months after first claiming IS/JSA.
Since October 2005, lone parents who have been claiming IS for 12 months or
more with a youngest child aged 14 years or over have been required to attend
an interview once every three months to help them prepare for the transition to
work when their child reaches 16. This nationwide initiative will not be the
subject of this project.
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The range of services on offer includes: Work Search Premium, IWC, QWFIs (for LPs
with children aged 12 or over), Childcare Tasters/Childcare Chats, ESC, Action Plans,
Childcare Assist, Discovery Weeks, In-Work Emergencies Fund, Extra Administrative
Support for PAs, Enhanced Training for LP PAs, More Voluntary Contact with LPs
between WFIs, Additional CPM, Jobpoints in Children’s Centres, Access to Flexible
Provision, Marketing Package, In-Work Support.3 Results from a qualitative evaluation
of ND+fLP will be published in May 2007.
2.2 Overlaps between the policies
Table 2.1 summarises the programmes and defines the eligible population. The
group potentially affected by the most policies comprises lone parents who have
been on IS/JSA for at least 12 months and whose youngest child is aged at least 12.
Table 2.1 Summary of the programmes and the eligible population
Under what
Who is potentially conditions
eligible? do they actually Administered
(the pilot group) receive treatment? at what level?
IWC Lone parents on IS or JSA Move off benefits and Jobcentre Plus
for at least 12 months into work (that is expected district
to last at least five weeks)
WSP Lone parents on IS or JSA Join NDLP and agree to Jobcentre Plus
for at least 12 months undertake job search district
activities
ESC Any parent in the area. None LEA
Lone parents are targeted but
not singled out
Childcare Taster Taster weeks: lone parents Taster weeks: if PA LEA
and partners on NDLP or NDP recommends
Chats: any lone parents Chats: if PA
recommends
ESQWFI Lone parents on IS for at least Automatic Jobcentre Plus
12 months whose youngest child district
is aged 12 or more in ESC areas
ND+fLP Any lone parent meeting the It is a voluntary Jobcentre Plus
conditions for joining NDLP programme district
Table 2.2 shows which Jobcentre Plus Districts and LEAs are operating which
policies. The ‘Phase’ column of this table indicates which Phase each Jobcentre Plus
district/LEA has been allocated to for the purposes of this evaluation: this is defined
according to the date on which IWC was introduced in each district. As not all
Lone parent pilots: what policies are being evaluated?
3 There is some variation in service provision between the districts offering ND+fLP:
WSP is not being offered in North London; and there isn’t an ESC pilot, nor are
there ESQWFIs, in Edinburgh or Cardiff & Vale (see Table G.3 for more details).
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policies are introduced at the same time within areas, Table 2.2 presents more
accurate spatial and temporal overlaps.
Table 2.2 Spatial and temporal overlap of the lone parent pilots
LEA in LEA as
which % of
Childcare Jobcentre ESC
Jobcentre Tasters/ESC Plus and Childcare
Plus district runs district IWC WSP ESQWFI Tasters ND+fLP Phase
Bradford Bradford 100 9 9 9 9 9 1
North London Haringey 40 9 9 9 9 1
SE London Greenwich 40 9 9 9 9 9 1
SE London Lewisham 40 9 9 9 9 9 1
Cardiff & Vale 9 9 9
Central London 9 9 2
Dudley & Sandwell Sandwell 60 9 9 9 9 9 2
Edinburgh, Lothian
& Borders 9 9 9
Lancashire West 9 9 2
Leeds 9 9 2
Leicestershire Leicester 60 9 9 9 9 9 2
Leicestershire Leicestershire 40 9 9 9 9 9 2
Staffordshire 9 2
West London 9 9 9 2
Brent, Harrow &
Hillingdon 9 3
City & East London 9 3
Lambeth, Southwark
& Wandsworth 9 3
South London 9 3
Birmingham & Solihull 9
Forth Valley & Fife Fife 100 9 9
Glasgow 9
Grampian & Tayside Aberdeenshire 30 9 9
Liverpool 9
Oldham & Rochdale 9
SE Wales Torfaen 30 9 9
Notes: ‘Phase’ is assigned according to the date on which the IWC programme was introduced in
each district: April 2004 for the Phase 1 districts, October 2004 for the Phase 2 districts and April
2005 for the Phase 3 districts. Note that other policies may have been introduced at a later date
in some districts. See Table G.2 for more details. The Phase 4 districts (all in south-east England)
are not included, as they will not be considered in this report. ‘Phase’ has been assigned by the
authors according to the date on which the IWC pilot was introduced. Note that Phase 3 and
Phase 4 are formally not considered to be pilot districts, but this project is examining the impact
of IWC in these districts. The series ‘LEA as per cent of Jobcentre Plus district’ is the proportion of
lone parents on IS in a particular district that live within the boundaries of the LEA.
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2.3 Summary
This chapter has outlined the different policies being piloted as part of the LPPs.
It is the opinion of the researchers that the impact of the lone parent pilots will be
dominated by the impact of IWC, which in principle substantially alters the financial
gain to working for eligible lone parents (it also operates in more districts than the
other policies, reaching around 45 per cent of lone parents on benefit for at least a
year will live in districts offering IWC). It should be noted, though, that the analysis in
this report does not attempt to estimate the additional impact of each policy:
instead, it estimates an average impact of the lone parent pilots. In fact, this decision
was made only after the size of the average impact estimates had been established:
as will be seen in Chapter 5, the impact estimates are small and often insignificant,
such that it would be extremely difficult to test for significant differences between
estimates that are even less likely to be significant.
Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 4, the analysis will only consider the impact of
the lone parent pilots operating in English Jobcentre Plus districts, because some of
the data that will be used in the analysis (discussed in Chapter 4) is not available in a
consistent form across Great Britain.
Lone parent pilots: what policies are being evaluated?
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3 Aims of the research and
methodology
This chapter is intended to set out the aims of the research project as a whole, and
this report in particular. It also describes the methods used to estimate the impact of
the lone parent pilots (LPPs).
Section 3.1 discusses the aims of this report and of the project as a whole; Section
3.2 outlines how estimating the impact of the LPPs relies on the choice of an
appropriate comparison group, and Section 3.3 discusses the methodology in more
detail, including the potential role for the testing of unobserved differences
between pilot and comparison areas4.
3.1 Aims of this report, and of the research project as a
whole
The aim of this project is to estimate the short- and long-run impacts of the LPPs on
the labour market outcomes of lone parents on Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA) living in the pilot districts:
• the short-run estimates – presented for districts comprising Phases 1 to 3 of the
LPPs in this report – will identify impacts on various labour market outcomes for
individuals who have either never received payments of In Work Credit (IWC)
and/or Work Search Premium (WSP) or who are still receiving payments.
• the long-run estimates – not considered in this report but due to be analysed in
future reports – will estimate impacts on the same outcomes for individuals who
are no longer receiving IWC or WSP payments.
4 This means characteristics that are not recorded in data available to the researcher
and that are likely to affect labour market outcomes.
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The evaluation will also investigate whether the impact of the LPPs changes over
time. It will not, however, discuss whether the results are informative about the
impact of a national programme: this would require consideration of, amongst
other matters, whether the impact of the LPPs in the districts currently operating
them was a good indication of the impact of the LPPs in the districts currently not
operating them, and whether there might be any general equilibrium effects that
would reduce any impact of the pilots.
This report presents estimates of the short-run impact of being potentially eligible
for the LPPs, by estimating their impact on the labour market outcomes of lone
parents (living in the pilot districts) who have an IS/JSA claim that lasts in excess of 12
months. The estimates are based on benefit (work) outcome data covering the first
two years (18 months) of the operation of the pilots in the Phase 1 districts, the first
18 months (12 months) in the Phase 2 districts, and the first 12 months (six months)
in the Phase 3 districts.5 The impact of the LPPs on lone parents living in Phase 4
districts are not considered in this report.
Information on whether individual lone parents actually participated in or benefited
from the pilots was not made available to the authors in time to be utilised in this
report; instead, the evaluation makes use of the fact that certain lone parents were
potentially eligible for the pilots, and examines the impact of being potentially eligible
on various labour market outcomes. This concept of being potentially eligible is
fundamental to the evaluation: a lone parent is potentially eligible for the LPPs if they
live in a pilot district and have been on IS/JSA for at least 12 months.6 In the evaluation
jargon, this means that this report presents estimates of the ‘intention to treat’ of the
lone parent pilots. Chapter 4 of this report describes how this definition was
implemented in practice, with more detail available in Appendix B.
Two further reports are planned:
• The next report will cover outcomes up to the end of April 2007, roughly 36
months after the Phase 1 pilots began, 30 months after the Phase 2 pilots began
and 24 months after the Phase 3 pilots began. This report will be able to investigate
the medium-run outcomes for some individuals who are no longer receiving
IWC or WSP. It will also include some shorter-run analysis for the Phase 4 pilots
(which started in October 2005).
• The final report will cover outcomes up to the end of October 2008, roughly 54
months after the Phase 1 pilots began, 48 months after the Phase 2 pilots began,
42 months after the Phase 3 pilots began and 36 months after the Phase 4 pilots
began. This report will be able to investigate the medium- to long-run outcomes
for some individuals in all pilot districts who are no longer receiving IWC or WSP.
Aims of the research and methodology
5 See Table 2.2 for details of the districts (and policies) that are included in each
Phase.
6 For Extended Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (ESQWFIs), there are
additional restrictions based on the child’s age.
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An additional, interim, report will be published in the Department for Work and
Pensions (DWP) Working paper series later in 2007. This report will explore  technical
issues, including alternative ways of estimating the impact of the pilots.
It is also hoped that the range of outcomes under consideration in future reports will
increase as the primary source of work and benefit data – the Work and Pensions
Longitudinal Study (WPLS) – expands to include more sources of administrative
data. For example, the planned inclusion of earnings data in the WPLS will
potentially enable estimation of the long-run impact of IWC on earnings (this might
work, for example, by increasing retention rates amongst lone parents, thus
increasing their future bargaining power in the labour market).
The reports that follow will also have an additional aim:
• To partially estimate the impact of the policy regime on all lone parents in the
pilot districts by examining the impact of the LPPs on all lone parents who claim
IS/JSA (not just those whose claim exceeds 12 months).
In general, these two concepts – the impact of being potentially eligible and the
impact of the policy regime – are different where individuals are able to influence the
likelihood of becoming potentially eligible for the policy.
The concepts are different in the case of the LPPs, because lone parents can choose
whether/how long to remain on IS/JSA. Theoretically, if they were aware of IWC or
WSP, some lone parents on IS/JSA might delay leaving benefits until the duration of
their claim exceeds 12 months in order to become potentially eligible for IWC or
WSP; conversely, the prospect of having to attend Quarterly Work Focused
Interviews (QWFIs) as part of the Extended Schools Childcare programme (ESQWFIs)
may induce some lone parents to leave IS/JSA in the first 12 months when they might
not have done so had they been unaware of ESQWFIs.
As a result of the potential for this type of behaviour, the effect of the policy regime
as a whole might be different from the impact only on those who are potentially
eligible. But the assessment of the impact of the policy regime (in future reports) will
be partial, because it is not planned to investigate whether the LPPs induce lone
parents to start claiming IS/JSA when they would not otherwise have done so, nor
whether lone parents claiming IS/JSA move into pilot districts specifically in order to
take advantage of the LPPs. This is primarily because such an evaluation would
require information on all lone parents living in the LPP districts.
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3.2 What responses to the pilots are predicted by economic
theory?
Economic theory suggests the following responses to the lone parent pilots:
• For potentially eligible lone parents, IWC should make it more likely that a lone
parent on IS/JSA leaves benefit to work at least 16 hours a week, because it
makes jobs at any given hourly wage more attractive than they were in the
absence of IWC. Economists would say that the IWC reduces the reservation
wages of potentially-eligible lone parents, where the reservation wage is the
lowest (gross) hourly wage that would induce a lone parent to move into work.
However, IWC may induce a lone parent to leave IS/JSA for a job with lower
earnings (as a result of fewer hours or a lower hourly wage) than they would
otherwise have done so in the absence of IWC. Both of these effects will decline
when an individual stops receiving IWC payments, but there may be some dynamic
processes which act to offset this (such as returns to job tenure). In the absence
of such dynamic effects, some lone parents may quit jobs as soon as they have
received their 12 months of IWC payments, if they perceive that the financial
gain to work without the IWC is insufficiently high to justify remaining in work.
• The theoretical impacts of WSP on potentially eligible lone parents are ambiguous.
WSP payments increase the reward to not working, thereby raising each lone
parent’s reservation wage, and reducing flows off IS/JSA and into work. But
receipt of WSP is conditional on the lone parent increasing their job search activity,
which should increase the likelihood of the lone parent receiving an acceptable
job offer, thereby increasing flows off IS/JSA and into work. Both of these effects
should stop once an individual has received their six months of WSP payments.
The increased search effort may lead to lone parents finding more suitable jobs,
perhaps leading to increased employment durations and higher hourly wages.
• Both WSP and IWC should induce some lone parents who would otherwise
have left IS/JSA within 12 months to remain on IS/JSA for longer, in order to be
entitled to these additional payments. In the extreme, they may also induce lone
parents who would otherwise not have claimed IS/JSA at all to claim IS/JSA and
continue doing so for at least 12 months in order to become eligible for IWC/
WSP. This report does not provide estimates of the size of these impacts (indeed,
the approach described below implicitly assumes that these effects are negligible
in size), but they will be considered in future reports.
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• Extended Schools Childcare (ESC) pilots should increase parents’ information
about childcare opportunities and/or make it easier to access. This should increase
the usage of formal childcare, perhaps at the expense of informal childcare. It is
harder to predict what impact this may have on labour market outcomes. One
of the policy justifications for ESC pilots is (presumably) that some lone parents
have to use formal childcare in order to be able to work, meaning that expenditure
on formal childcare acts like an additional tax on wages. This means that making
affordable formal childcare easier to access would reduce lone parents’ reservation
wages, and make it more likely that a lone parent on IS/JSA leaves IS/JSA to work
at least 16 hours a week (this is akin to a substitution effect). However, if the
nature of the demand for childcare is more complicated than this, then other
responses are possible.7 The effects of ESC may persist after the end of the pilot,
depending on how the Local Education Authority (LEA) has used the money (for
example, investment in infrastructure may mean that any impacts persist after
the money stops). In contrast to the IWC and WSP, all of the effects of ESC
described above will also apply to parents who are not on IS/JSA and those who
are already in work: for example, some parents already working might work for
longer because affordable formal childcare is now easier to access, and some
may work less now that they need to work for fewer hours to afford formal
childcare, but this evaluation will not be able to estimate such effects because it
is investigating the impact of the lone parent pilots only on lone parents who
have been on benefit for at least 12 months.
• ESQWFIs should increase flows off IS/JSA and into work through various
mechanisms that increase the likelihood of the lone parent receiving an acceptable
job offer. They may also act as a deterrent, and lead to some lone parents leaving
IS/JSA in under 12 months in order to avoid having a ESQWFI. Note that this
effect is only relevant for lone parents with a youngest child aged 12 or above
(as they are the only lone parents potentially eligible for this policy).
3.3 What outcome variables will be investigated?
The key outcomes of interest under consideration in this report are whether, at
particular points in time, lone parents (who are potentially eligible for the LPPs) are
more likely to have stopped claiming benefits, or are more likely to have started
working, than lone parents who were not exposed to the pilots: this choice of
outcomes is entirely dictated by the scope of the administrative data used in this
evaluation (described in Chapter 4).
Chapter 4 provides more details of these outcomes. But three points should be
stressed:
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26
• Rather than investigate whether a particular spell of IS/JSA has stopped, the
analysis examines outcomes for individuals, taking full account of repeat benefit
claims and repeated spells in work.
• This evaluation assesses the impact of the LPPs only on the ultimate policy
outcomes: flow rates off benefits and/or movements into work. It will not
investigate the impact on intermediate outcomes, such as the use of formal
childcare, family incomes or poverty rates, nor on any indicators of adult or child
wellbeing.
• The administrative data used in this evaluation limits the population whose
outcomes can be measured to people who (at some point since June 1999) have
claimed a DWP-administered benefit.8 This means, for example, that it cannot
provide any information on the impact of the LPPs on the lone parent employment
rate, nor on the proportion of lone parents claiming IS/JSA.
These restrictions may mean that this evaluation does not lead to a complete
understanding of why and how any impacts of the LPPs actually arise: the
separately-commissioned qualitative work (the first report of which is due to be
published in Spring 2007) will address these issues.
3.4 The populations of interest
This report distinguishes between two groups of lone parents:
• Lone parents who have been claiming IS/JSA continuously for at least 12 months
when the pilots are introduced in their district. This group is potentially eligible
for the LPPs on the day that the pilots start. This group is referred to as the stock
sample.
• Lone parents who have been claiming IS/JSA for less than 12 months (or who
have not yet made a claim for IS/JSA at all) when the pilots are introduced in
their district. This group is referred to as the flow sample. These individuals may
become potentially eligible for the pilots if they stay on IS/JSA long enough. In
theory, their behaviour whilst on IS/JSA may be affected by the introduction of
the LPPs’ policy regime even before their claim reaches 12 months, but this
possibility is disregarded for the purposes of this report (it will be explicitly
considered in future reports).
Of course, lone parents do move between pilot and non-pilot districts during the
period of interest, and this is taken into account when constructing the samples for
analysis (see Section 4.2 and Appendix B for more details).
The estimate of long-run impact of the LPPs can only be made using the flow sample,
because, in the long run, the stock sample will all leave IS/JSA, and the only lone
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parents eligible for the pilots will be those from the flow sample (ie those who have
started a claim of IS/JSA after the LPPs began). In the short-run, though, given the
relatively low off-flow rates from benefits (and the relatively low in-flow rates into
work) – see Chapter 5 for more details – it is likely that the analysis will provide a more
accurate estimate of the impact of the pilots on the stock than on the flow sample,
simply because there are many more individuals in the stock.
3.5 Estimating the impact of the lone parent pilots:
identifying the counterfactual using a comparison
group of lone parents
3.5.1 Choosing a comparison group to provide a counter-factual
Identifying the impact of being potentially eligible for the LPPs (or of the LPPs policy
regime more generally) requires the following key question to be answered: how
different would the outcomes of lone parents living in the pilot districts have been if
they had not had access to the pilots? This is called the ‘counterfactual’.
If outcomes were available for lone parents living in the pilot districts had they not
been potentially eligible for the pilots, then there would be no evaluation problem.
But given that at any moment in time, everyone is either living in the pilot districts
(i.e. potentially eligible) or not, but can never be in both situations at once, there is an
obvious ‘missing data’ problem. Thus, constructing the counterfactual is the central
issue that most evaluations face.9
This issue can be addressed with an appropriate comparison or comparison group
from the set of IS/JSA customers who were not affected by the pilots. Such a group
needs to be as similar as possible to the pilot group (to those lone parents whose IS/
JSA claim made them potentially eligible for the pilots), as the purpose of the
comparison group is to provide a guide to the outcomes that lone parents in the pilot
group would have achieved had they not been affected by the pilots. Given this, it is
then possible to isolate the impact of the pilots on these outcomes.
Three potential comparison groups are:
• lone parents (who have been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months) living in
districts not affected by the LPPs;
• non-lone parents (who have been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months) living
in districts that are affected by the LPPs;10
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10 These non-lone parents could be either individuals living as part of a two-parent
family, or single individuals without children. Clearly, such individuals differ in
important respects from lone parents, and in ways that are likely to affect the
likelihood of being able to find work and/or leave benefits.
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• lone parents in districts affected by the LPPs but who are not yet potentially
eligible (i.e. lone parents in the LPP districts who have been on IS/JSA for less
than 12 months).
In practice, the comparison group needs to be one that can be identified in the
administrative data, so it has to be a group that claims a DWP-administered benefit.
One can think of potential comparison groups who were not claiming IS/JSA, but
individuals in the comparison group need to be as similar as possible to individuals in
the pilot group, and whether a person is claiming IS/JSA is clearly an important
difference that is likely to impact on future labour market outcomes. The comparison
group preferred by the authors is the first outlined above: lone parents who have
been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months but who do not live in LPP districts.
Non-lone parents are likely to differ from lone parents in their propensity to leave
benefits and move into work in many ways, some of which may be due to
characteristics that cannot be observed. This causes difficulties in trying to use a
group of non-lone parents to act as a guide to how lone parents would have acted
in the absence of the LPPs, so the second group outlined above is not very attractive.
It is the authors’ view that it is not appropriate to use the third group described above
(lone parents in the LPP districts who leave IS/JSA in under 12 months) as a
comparison group, as such individuals may be affected by the LPP policy regime. In
particular:
• they will be eligible for ESC services;
• their behaviour whilst on IS/JSA will be unaffected by the existence of IWC/WSP
only if they do not realise that they may become eligible for IWC and/or WSP in
the future (or if they did realise this, but did not take it into account when
making decisions about looking for work whilst on benefits). Indeed, it is precisely
because such lone parents are affected by the LPP policy regime that the evaluation
will investigate (in future reports) the impact of the LPPs on all lone parents on
IS/JSA, not just those on IS/JSA for at least 12 months.
3.5.2 Testing for unobserved differences between pilot and
comparison districts
The drawback of using this first comparison group is that if there are characteristics
of the neighbourhoods in which lone parents live (or characteristics of the lone
parents themselves that differ across districts) that are important determinants of
labour market outcomes, but that cannot be controlled for (i.e. that are unobservable
to the researcher), then the evaluation may attribute an effect to the LPPs that is in
reality due to unobserved differences between the pilot and comparison groups.
This possibility is exacerbated by the fact that the pilot districts were chosen for
having particularly high lone parent shares in the IS caseload, and particularly low
off-flow rates from IS. However, the estimates will control for a large number of
neighbourhood characteristics that are relevant to the likelihood of whether an
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individual works or claims benefits in order to substantially reduce (or eliminate) the
possibility that there are unobserved neighbourhood characteristics that determine
labour market outcomes. (See Chapter 4 for more details about the local-area
characteristics that are controlled for.)
Tests were therefore carried out to determine whether such unobserved differences
across districts were likely to be problematic for this evaluation: these tests are
equivalent to estimating the impact of a hypothetical set of lone parent pilots during
a period where no such pilots existed (see Appendix J for more details). The results of
such tests suggest that there were unobserved differences in some labour market
outcomes (across phases, and in both the stock and flow samples). This indicates
that simply comparing the labour market outcomes of lone parents living in the pilot
and comparison districts is not sufficient to obtain an unbiased estimate of the
impact of the LPPs.
However, if one is prepared to assume that these unobserved differences are
changing in the same way over time across all districts (the ‘common trends’
assumption: this might mean, for example, that the level – the local unemployment
rate – is different, but that the trend – the change in unemployment over time - is the
same), then the impact of the LPPs can be estimated using a difference-in-
differences (DiD) estimator. This is the path taken in this evaluation.
A DiD estimator can be implemented using either linear methods (Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) or Fully Interacted Linear Matching (FILM)), or Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) techniques.11 Due to computational time constraints, only the
results from linear DiD estimators are given in this report. To implement DiD using
OLS/FILM, three dummy variables are required: the first indicates whether the
individual lives in a pilot or comparison district; the second indicates whether the
outcome in question is observed before or after the LPPs were introduced; the third
is an interaction of the first two dummy variables (taking value 1 if the individual lives
in the pilot district and has an outcome observed after the LPPs have started; 0
otherwise). It is this third dummy variable that provides the estimate of the impact of
the LPPs (see Box 3.1 for details).
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eligible lone parent in a pilot district is matched with three others: a lone parent
who has been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months and who lives in a control
district; a lone parent who has been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months and
who lives in a pilot district before the pilots began; and a lone parent who has
been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months and who lives in a control district
before the LPPs began. See section III.2 of Blundell et al. (2001), and Dearden
et al. (2001) for some examples of conditional (i.e. controlling for background
characteristics) DiD estimators using PSM.
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Box 3.1 The DiD estimators
An alternative way of describing the DiD estimator is as follows.
Before policy After policy
Comparison Pilot Comparison Pilot
districts districts districts districts
Lone parents B0 A0 B1 A1
If the Letters A and B refer to the mean (average) outcome for the group in
question, having controlled for differences in observable characteristics, then
the DiD estimator is given by (A1 – A0) – (B1 – B0). This is the trend in the pilot
districts minus the trend in the comparison districts.
There are two main disadvantages of using a DiD estimator.
First, by considering changes over time (rather than levels), the precision of estimates
typically worsens, i.e. the size of the standard errors increases. This makes it more
difficult to obtain reliable results, which may be particularly relevant if the impact
estimates are small.
Second, it is hard to evaluate medium- to long-run outcomes using a difference-in-
difference estimator because one is more constrained (than with other estimators)
by the period covered by the data. Although this issue will not become relevant until
future reports in this project, it is discussed more in Chapter 4, after the data used in
this project has been described.
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4 Constructing a sample of
interest from the
administrative data
This chapter describes how the final dataset used in the analysis was constructed.
Section 4.1 gives an overview of the variables used in the analysis, and their original
sources, as well as the process followed to construct the final dataset.
Section 4.2 describes how the sample of individuals (or Income Support (IS) claims)
potentially affected by the lone parent pilots (LPPs) was constructed. Chapter 4
concludes by summarising some of the limitations of the data.
Much of the detail is contained in various Appendices, referred to in the text.
4.1 Overview
This section lists the datasets that were used (and the process that was followed) to
construct the final dataset used in this evaluation.
The six datasets that were used (together with the acronym or phrase that is used to
refer to them) are:
• The Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS): the WPLS combines
employment (or, more accurately, income tax) records from Her Majesty’s Revenue
and Customs (HMRC), with a range of programme and benefit spells from the
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).
• The National Benefits Database (NBD): the NBD contains more details of the
benefit records that appear in the WPLS (for example, information concerning
amount of benefit received at the start of the claim).
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• The Income Support History file (IS History file): the IS History file records all
changes in personal circumstances that occur during an Income Support (IS)
claim; for example, changes in partner status, changes in the number of children
for which the claimant is responsible, the date of birth of their youngest child,
disability status, postcode, etc.
• Key Statistics from Census 2001, plus a bespoke tabulation, courtesy of the
Office for National Statistics (Census).
• Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) data on registered child-carers in
England (Ofsted).12
• The 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), containing data from 2002.
• Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA) data on unemployment and vacancy rates from
NOMIS, for the financial year 2002-03.
The data-set used for the empirical work was created in several stages:
First, the IS History file and the WPLS were used to create a set of benefit claims that
were potentially affected by the LPPs: this is discussed further in Section 4.2.13
For the estimates of the impact of the LPPs to be valid, the difference-in-differences
(DiD) estimator needs to control for all characteristics that might affect the outcomes
of interest, including factors that might affect lone parents’ ability and willingness to
return to work. In the case of linear regression methods (either Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) or Fully Interacted Linear Matching (FILM)), these characteristics make
up the ‘explanatory’ or ‘right-hand-side’ variables.14 The final dataset therefore
includes a large set of background characteristics that will be used in the analysis (full
details of which can be found in Appendix F).
12 Note that only pilot and control districts in England are being used to estimate
the impact of the LPPs in this report: the impact of the LPPs in Scotland and
Wales will be analysed separately at a later date. This is partly because the data
on child-carers is available differentially across England, Scotland and Wales.
13 Almost no individuals had more than one benefit claim that was potentially
eligible by the lone parent pilots in the period under investigation in this report
(and the analysis effectively pretends that any such claims were made by different
people), although this will become more likely in the data analysed in subsequent
reports.
14 In the case of propensity score matching (PSM) techniques, these are the variables
that are included in the first-stage regression (of whether an individual lives in
a pilot district) that is used to generate the propensity score (i.e. they are the
variables on which individuals in the pilot and control groups are ‘matched’, or
made to look similar). Note, however, that PSM techniques will not be used in
this report, due to time constraints.
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These variables are:
• A set of benefit and work history variables derived from the WPLS covering the
period 1-30 months before the individual first became potentially eligible for the
LPPs. The creation of these variables is discussed further in Appendix C and D.
• A set of background characteristics from the WPLS/NBD: age, gender and ethnicity
of the claimant (from the WPLS); amount of benefit (from the NBD). All of these
variables (except ethnicity) were recorded at the start of the claim.
• A set of variables from the IS History file: age of youngest child and number of
children (recorded at the time at which the individual first became potentially
eligible for the LPPs).
• A set of local-area variables derived from several sources (and described in
Appendix E). Because relatively little information about individual characteristics
is available from the WPLS and the NBD, it is a key feature of the evaluation that
local area variables are merged into the final dataset. Some variables are included
because they provide information about some aspect of the local labour market
that is likely to affect whether lone parents are able to find work and/or leave
benefits (for example, the local unemployment rate); others are included to proxy
for certain characteristics (for example, highest educational qualification) that
are unavailable at the individual level, but that are likely to be important
determinants of lone parents’ labour market outcomes. This is done by including
the average level of the characteristic for all individuals living in a small
neighbourhood, typically Super Output Area (SOA) level, comprising
approximately 1,500 households. These variables were mapped into the sample
of benefit claims (described below) on the basis of the individual’s postcode at
the time they first became potentially eligible for the LPPs.
It should be stressed that the authors consider that there is a high degree of noise in
the measure of work in the WPLS. The employment records in the WPLS are based
on employers’ returns to HMRC for individuals they are employing who are earning
enough to be liable for Income Tax or National Insurance. This means that it may not
include individuals who are in work, but earning below the personal threshold
(although the received wisdom is that many, mainly large, employers do report such
spells of work), nor other spells of work that have not been declared to HMRC. For
this reason, the data may underestimate the amount of time spent in work.
However, there is a general feeling that the way in which uncertain start and end
dates are recorded may lead to an overestimate of the amount of time spent in work
if all dates in the WPLS are taken at face value. Adjustments made to the WPLS are
discussed in Appendix C.
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4.2 The sample of benefit claims potentially affected by the
lone parent pilots
The sample of IS/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claims used in this evaluation will be of
at least 12 months in length (including in combination, if relevant), and will be made
by lone parents who live in either a pilot district or a comparison district. Further
details of exactly how this sample was selected can be found in Appendix B.
This report focuses on the impact of the LPPs in the first three phases of the LPPs in
England (see Chapter 2 for more details). The pilot districts therefore comprise:
• Phase 1: Bradford; North London; South East London.
• Phase 2: Dudley & Sandwell; Lancashire West; Leicestershire; Leeds; Staffordshire;
Central London; West London.
• Phase 3: Brent, Harrow & Hillingdon; City & East London; Lambeth, Southwark
& Wandsworth; South London.
The comparison districts comprise all districts in England that will be operating
neither the LPPs (this rules out those districts in South-East England that make up
Phase 4 – see Chapter 2 for more details), nor the Employment Retention and
Advancement (ERA) demonstration. The exception is that districts that are only
operating the Childcare Taster pilots (Birmingham & Solihull, Liverpool, and Oldham
& Rochdale) have been included in the comparison districts for the purposes of this
evaluation, because the impact of these pilots alone is likely to be minimal.15
Individuals whose IS/JSA claims are included in the analysis will therefore have lived
in one of these districts at some point whilst the pilots were in operation.
This report is considering outcomes only for individuals whose IS/JSA claim exceeds
12 months: this is equivalent to assuming that there are no ‘anticipatory’ effects of
In-Work Credit (IWC) or Work Search Premium (WSP) on IS/JSA claims that have not
yet reached 12 months; it also means that the potential impact of Extended Schools
Childcare (ESC) or Childcare Taster on IS/JSA claims that have not yet reached 12
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15 The control districts are therefore: Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire,
North Nottinghamshire, Greater Nottingham, Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suffolk,
Northumberland, Newcastle & North Tyne, Gateshead & South Tyne, City of
Sunderland, County Durham, Tees Valley, Cumbria, Cheshire, Lancashire East,
Knowsley & Sefton, Wirral, Liverpool, St Helens & Halton, Manchester, Salford
& Trafford, Stockport & Tameside, Bolton & Bury, Wigan, Oldham & Rochdale,
Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorset, Gloucestershire, West of England, Somerset,
Wiltshire, Birmingham & Solihull, Wolverhampton & Walsall, Coventry &
Warwickshire, Herefordshire & Worcestershire, Shropshire, North Yorkshire, Hull
& East Riding, South Humber, Calderdale & Kirklees, Wakefield, Sheffield,
Barnsley & Rotherham, and Doncaster.
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months is not estimated (although such lone parents are potentially eligible for these
programmes). The impact of the LPPs on all individuals claiming IS/JSA will be
estimated in future reports.
As this evaluation is making use of a DiD estimator, it is necessary to measure
outcomes (and background characteristics) for individuals in the pilot and comparison
districts both following the introduction of the real lone parent pilots, and over the
same period following the introduction of a hypothetical policy at some point in the
past.
Benefit outcomes are available in the WPLS from mid-1999 to 31 March 2006; work
outcomes are available from mid-1999 to 30 September 2005. This means that
benefit outcomes can be measured for up to two years following the introduction of
the LPPs for the Phase 1 districts, and work outcomes for up to 18 months
afterwards.
To implement the DiD estimator, it is necessary to choose a date on which a
hypothetical programme is deemed to have started. This date is to some extent
arbitrary, but there are two constraints:
• The date must be sufficiently far in the past so that the outcomes under
investigation are not affected by the actual LPPs. In this report, data was available
on outcomes up to two years after the actual lone parent pilots began, and so
the hypothetical programme has to begin on or before 1 April 2002, two years
before the Phase 1 pilots began.
• Because the analysis uses information on individuals’ work and benefit histories
in the 30 months before becoming eligible to the (hypothetical or real) lone
parent pilots, the date of the hypothetical programme must be at least 30 months
after the start of the WPLS (1 June 1999). This means that the hypothetical
programme has to begin no earlier than 1 January 2002 (of course, the analysis
could have used information on a shorter period of previous benefit and work
histories than 30 months).
Another way of understanding this is to realise that, when using a DiD estimator,
there is a direct trade-off between the length of benefit and work histories that are
used in the analysis as explanatory factors, and the length of time after the pilots
began over which outcomes are analysed. This is an important disadvantage of DiD
estimators.
In this analysis, it was assumed that the hypothetical pilots were introduced in all
three Phases in April 2002.
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As outlined in Section 3.1.3, two samples are analysed in this evaluation:
• The stock sample: includes all IS/JSA claims being made by lone parents living
in one of the pilot districts whose duration equals or exceeds 12 months at the
point at which the LPPs began: these claims were potentially affected by the
pilots from the day they were introduced.16
• The flow sample: includes all IS/JSA claims being made by lone parents living in
one of the pilot districts whose duration equals or exceeds 12 months at some
point between 1 April 2004 and 30 September 2005 (the ‘inflow window’). This
means that a lone parent whose IS/JSA claim exceeds 12 months and who moves
into one of the pilot districts between 1 April 2004 and 30 September 2005 is
included in the pilot group of the flow sample; as is an individual who has been
claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months, has always lived in a pilot district and has
children, but who becomes a lone parent during this period.
The same conditions apply to the creation of the stock and flow samples associated
with the hypothetical pilots, with the period 1 April 2002 to 30 September 2003
representing the inflow window for the flow sample.
Table 4.1 gives the number of IS/JSA claims potentially eligible for the lone parent
pilots (the sample sizes for the hypothetical pilots are given in Appendix J). Note that
there are three different comparison samples for the stock sample: the comparison
sample for the Phase 1 stock sample comprises all lone parents in comparison
districts on IS/JSA for at least 12 months on 1 April 2004; the comparison sample for
the Phase 2 stock sample comprises all lone parents in comparison districts on IS/JSA
for at least 12 months on 24 October 2004, and the comparison sample for the
Phase 3 stock sample comprises all lone parents in comparison districts on IS/JSA for
at least 12 months on 4 April 2005. On the other hand, the comparison sample for
flow sample comprises all lone parents whose claim for IS/JSA reached 12 months
after 1 April 2004 and who were living in a comparison district at the time.
Table 4.1 Sample sizes for LPPs (introduced from 1 April 2004)
Comparison Districts
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1 2 3
Stock 42,374 77,290 71,705 299,469 292,344 285,134
Flow 14,480 16,928 7,152 109,163
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an IS spell are included, as described in Appendix B. But spells of JSA that begin
just after an IS spell ends are not included (nor are JSA spells that last 12 months
or longer with no accompanying IS spell), because the WPLS does not identify
whether individuals on JSA were lone parents.
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It is possible for an individual to have more than one benefit claim potentially
affected by the LPPs, but, for simplicity, only the first such spell has been included in
each sample. The analysis also does not make use of the fact that some individuals
stop being eligible for the LPPs if they move from a pilot into a comparison district, if
they are no longer responsible for a child, or if they start to cohabit. This means that
the sample of IS claims in the treatment samples comprise those lone parents whose
claims have ever been potentially eligible to the lone parent pilots, rather than those
lone parents whose claims were potentially eligible on any given date.
Full details of how the samples were constructed are given in Appendix B.
4.3 Summary
This chapter has described how the final dataset used in the analysis was constructed.
For completeness, this section summarises the limitations of this.
As with most administrative datasets, the WPLS, IS History file and NBD do not
contain many personal characteristics. In estimating the impact of the LPPs, it is
important to control for all factors that are likely to affect a lone parent’s ability and/
or willingness to find work. If these characteristics cannot be measured at an
individual level, or be proxied for by using local-area level data, then this may bias the
results.
One of the background characteristics that can be controlled for is previous labour
market history: for 30 months prior to the individual becoming potentially eligible to
the LPPs in this report. Because the presence of unobserved differences between
districts (see Appendix J for details) necessitates the use of a DiD estimator, the
availability of outcome data from the WPLS will be an important constraint on future
analysis. There is a direct trade-off between the length of benefit and work histories
that are used in the analysis as explanatory factors, and the length of time after the
pilots began over which outcomes are analysed. This is an important disadvantage
of DiD estimators, and will be addressed in future reports.
A final limitation of the data used in this report is that it only contains benefit
outcomes up to 31 March 2006 and work outcomes up to 30 September 2005. This
means that all of the impacts estimated in this report are of a relatively short-run
nature, and that the analysis is of only the first 12 months (Phase 3 districts) or 24
months (Phase 1 districts) of the operation of the lone parent pilots.
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5 The additional impact of
the lone parent pilots on
work and benefit receipt
This chapter presents analysis of the key outcomes after the lone parent pilots (LPPs)
were implemented.
Section 5.1 discusses the results of comparing labour market outcomes in the pilot
and comparison districts after the pilots started, but without adjusting for any
background characteristics.
Section 5.2 discusses the rate of take-up of or participation in the In-Work Credit
(IWC) programme. This is of interest because some measures of take-up give the
theoretical upper bound to the additional impact of the lone parent pilots on labour
market outcomes; furthermore, knowing what fraction of lone parents actually
received IWC helps the estimated impacts to be understood better.
Section 5.3 presents the main estimates of the impact of the pilots, based on
difference-in-difference (DiD) estimates.
Section 5.4 investigates whether the impact of the pilots varied across districts and
between different types of lone parents, and Section 5.5 summaries the results
presented in this chapter.
5.1 Key outcomes for lone parents affected by the lone
parent pilots
This section discusses the results of comparing benefit and work outcomes in the
pilot and comparison districts after the pilots started, without adjusting for any
background characteristics.
The full analysis is presented in Appendix M, which illustrates the proportions of
potentially eligible lone parents in the stock and flow samples who are in work or
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have left benefits at various points in time, all measured relative to the date at which
they became potentially eligible for IWC.
The key points are that:
• Individuals in pilot districts are slower to leave benefits and spend less time in
work than those in comparison districts.
• Individuals in the flow sample leave benefits more quickly and spend more time
in work than those in the stock sample.
• Two years before first becoming eligible for the LPPs (usually 12 months before
starting the relevant Income Support (IS)/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claim),
between 27 per cent and 32 per cent of individuals in the flow sample are
recorded as being in work, and between 40 per cent and 45 per cent are claiming
benefits. At the same point in time, approximately 15 per cent of individuals in
the stock samples are recorded as being in work, while almost 90 per cent are
claiming benefits.
• On the date that individuals first become eligible for the LPPs, between 11 per
cent (of the stock) and 21 per cent (of the flow) are recorded as being in work.
Although it is possible to be both in work and receiving IS, this proportion seems
rather high.
• After 12 months, between 14 per cent and 20 per cent of the flow sample have
left benefits. Between 20 per cent and 26 per cent are in work: this is an increase
of less than five percentage points from the point at which the LPPs were
introduced.
• After 12 months, between nine per cent and 14 per cent of the stock sample
have left benefits. Between 14 per cent and 18 per cent are in work: an increase
of less than six percentage points from the point at which the LPPs were
introduced.
The last two points suggest that, although the work measure in the Work and
Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) may not be an accurate guide to the proportion
of lone parents actually in work, changes over time may be more accurate.
5.2 Participation in (or take-up of) In Work Credit
This section presents a number of different ways of looking at the extent of
participation in the IWC programme.17 A significant issue in estimating a take-up
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the lone parent pilots would be dominated by the impact of IWC, but also
because administrative data held by Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
showed that participation in Work Search Premium (WSP) and Childcare Taster
were both extremely low. It is not possible to define a participation measure for
the services offered through an Extended Schools Childcare (ESC) pilot.
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rate is defining and recording in the WPLS the relevant population of lone parents
eligible to receive IWC. It provides estimates of participation or take-up rates using
three different definitions. These are:
i. Number receiving IWC as a percentage of the number of potentially eligible
lone parents (where, as in the rest of this report, potentially eligible means a
lone parent on IS or JSA for at least 12 months, and who lives in a pilot
district).
ii. Number receiving IWC as a percentage of the number of potentially eligible
lone parents (defined as above) who left benefit.
iii. Number receiving IWC as a percentage of the number of potentially eligible
lone parents (defined as above) who left benefit and started a job (as recorded
in the WPLS).
At the time this report was written, the evaluation team did not have access to
individual-level data on receipt of IWC but only data on the total number of IWC
recipients, and the number of new IWC payments, by district and by month.18 Future
reports will use individual level data on receipt of IWC in combination with the main
data extract from the WPLS.
To be genuinely entitled to IWC, a lone parent has to be potentially eligible, and then
leave benefit and start a job of at least 16 hours per week (as described in Chapter 2).
This means that definition (iii) is the closest to a genuine measure of take-up.
However, because of the limitations of the measure of work in the WPLS (see
Appendices C and D for more details), as shown below, this estimate of IWC take-up
exceeds 100 per cent. In theory, this could occur either because some lone parents
are receiving IWC when they genuinely do not meet the conditions, or because
some lone parents have genuinely met the conditions for receiving IWC, but this is
not being reflected in the WPLS. This latter situation will occur if, for example, a job
start date has been incorrectly recorded in the WPLS, or if a lone parent receiving
IWC has taken a job earning less than the personal allowance (which may not appear
in the WPLS).
Because of this problem in identifying (in the WPLS) lone parents who have met all of
the conditions necessary for receipt of IWC, the other two measures of take-up use
a broader definition of eligibility; by construction, these will have lower estimated
take-up rates. Measure (ii) requires that the lone parent is recorded in the WPLS as
leaving benefit, but does not necessarily have an entry for a new job. One downside
of this measure is that lone parents will leave benefit for reasons other than moving
into jobs of at least 16 hours a week, and so this measure of participation should
always be lower than 100 per cent.
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eligible for IWC. However, the overwhelming majority of IWC recipients are
lone parents.
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Measure (i) compares the numbers receiving IWC to the total population who could
receive IWC were they to leave benefit and start a job of at least 16 hours. This
measure is of interest partly because it provides a theoretical upper-bound to the
additional impact of IWC on the proportion of lone parents who leave benefit or
move into work: if none of the lone parents receiving IWC would have left benefit in
the absence of the IWC, then the additional impact of IWC would be equal to this
measure. In reality, though, it is likely that many of the lone parents receiving IWC
would have left benefit in the absence of the IWC, which is why this measure of take-
up is an upper bound.
Box 5.1 describes in detail how the WPLS is used to construct the denominator for
these three series.
Box 5.1 Estimating the number of lone parents eligible for IWC using
the WPLS
A take-up rate of IWC can be estimated by dividing the number of new IWC
claims by the number of lone parents who appear to be eligible to start an
IWC claim.
To use the WPLS to estimate the number of lone parents who appear to be
eligible for IWC, one needs to count the number of lone parents who were at
some point potentially eligible for IWC and who have stopped claiming benefits;
this is done for each month and each Jobcentre Plus district since the LPPs
started (this is the series used in Figure 5.10). To construct an estimate of
those lone parents who leave benefit for work, one needs to additionally look
for jobs that started within 90 days of the lone parent ceasing to receive
benefits.
It should be noted that the way that these measures were constructed mean
that both will slightly over-estimate the number of lone parents who are truly
eligible to IWC, and, therefore, under-estimate the participation rate. This is
because the data used for the analysis in this report did not include information
on whether a lone parent who becomes eligible for the lone parent pilots ever
ceased to be eligible by moving out of the district, or by ceasing to be a lone
parent. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that, once an individual
becomes potentially eligible for the LPPs, they remain potentially eligible until
they stop claiming benefits.
For the analysis in Figure 5.1, a running total of the number of lone parents
who were ever potentially eligible for the IWC was constructed and compared
with a cumulative total of the number of lone parents who had ever received
IWC: there should be no bias in these estimates.
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Figure 5.1 Participation measure (i): recipients of IWC as fraction
of all lone parents ever potentially eligible, by Phase
and month since LPPs started
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Figure 5.2 Participation measure (ii): new recipients of IWC as
fraction of all lone parents potentially eligible who
left benefit, by Phase and month since LPPs started
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Figure 5.3 Participation measure (iii): new recipients of IWC as
fraction of all lone parents potentially eligible who
left benefit and started a job, by Phase and month
since LPPs started
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show that:
First, the number of IWC recipients as a proportion of the potentially eligible
population has increased over time, and was still on a clear upward trend in
November 2005, 20 months after the pilots had started in the Phase 1 districts. In the
long-run, this ratio should remain constant, so Figure 5.1 suggests that IWC is still
not operating to its full potential in the Phase 1 districts even by November 2005.
This might reflect delays in lone parents discovering that they are potentially eligible
for IWC, or delays in the ability of Jobcentre Plus staff to market IWC effectively: the
data here cannot distinguish between these or alternative explanations. Because
this participation rate provides a theoretical upper bound to the impact of the IWC,
Figure 5.1 suggests that this impact may also be rising over time, and may be
continuing to rise even after 20 months of operation in the Phase 1 districts.
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Second, the participation rate varies across the Phases (and more so between the
districts, not shown here), with Phase 1 having lower participation rates than Phases
2 and 3. It is, though, not easy to interpret this finding: it could reflect differential
performance of Jobcentre Plus staff, or that it took longer in the Phase 1 districts for
staff and customers to become aware of IWC (one way of interpreting Figure 5.1 is
that the Phase 1 districts have a participation rate that is about three – four months
behind the Phase 2 districts: in other words, after 12 months, the Phase 2 districts
had a participation rate that the Phase 1 districts achieved after 15 months). On the
other hand, this disparity could reflect differences in local labour markets, or in the
characteristics of lone parents in the districts in the various Phases: given that
potentially eligible lone parents in the Phase 1 districts were less likely to leave
benefit than those in the Phase 2 districts in the absence of the lone parent pilots,
one should not be too surprised to see that participation in IWC as a proportion of all
potentially eligible lone parents also varies across Phases.
Third, on average, the number of new IWC claims each month is around half the
number of potentially eligible lone parents who leave benefit (Figure 5.2), but there
is variation over time and between Phases. Take-up under this measure has a slight
upward trend, consistent with potentially eligible lone parents who left benefit early
in the pilots not being aware of IWC. It is also higher in Phase 3 districts than in
districts from the other two Phases; as above, though, it is not clear whether this is
due to differential performance of Jobcentre Plus staff, differential awareness of
IWC amongst customers, or the fact that a higher proportion of benefit leavers in the
Phase 3 districts (compared with the other Phases) move into work.
Fourth, Figure 5.3 shows that the number of new IWC claims is consistently higher
than the estimated number of potentially eligible lone parents who leave benefit
and start a job, and the authors consider that this shows that the WPLS is providing
an underestimate of the latter. Because of this suspected issue with the data, it is
hard to interpret changes over time or variation between Phases.
5.3 Impact estimates
This section presents the main estimates of the impact of the lone parent pilots.
Estimates of the impact of the lone parent pilots produced using a DiD estimator are
equivalent to the coefficient on an indicator variable for being in a pilot district
interacted with an indicator variable for becoming potentially eligible to the lone
parent pilots after the pilots started. The coefficients on the other regressors in the
model (the individual and local-area characteristics) are not shown here, but the
regressors themselves are listed in Appendix F. Note that results are only shown for
the linear methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fully Interacted Linear
Matching (FILM): implementing DiD using propensity score matching (PSM) took
too long for it to be feasible to accurately compute standard errors.
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Below, separate tables are presented for benefit and work outcomes, for the stock
and flow samples, and for each Phase separately and (for the Flow sample19) all
Phases together.
5.3.1 Impact estimates: stock sample
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present impact estimates of the LPPs (in percentage point terms)
for the stock samples on work and benefit outcomes, alongside the mean outcome
for the pilot group. For the Phase 1 districts, benefit outcomes are available up to 24
months following the introduction of the pilots, whilst work outcomes are available
for up to 18 months; for the Phase 2 districts, the figures are 15 months and 12
months respectively following the introduction of the pilots; for the Phase 3 districts,
12 months and six months.
In all three Phases, the estimated impacts of the pilots on benefit outcomes are
relatively small, and often statistically significantly different from zero, particularly in
later months (the larger size of the stock samples means that differences of around
0.5 percentage points or more will tend to be statistically significant). As a guide to
how to interpret these results, the fourth row of the first table in Table 5.1 shows
that the OLS DiD impact estimate of the LPPs in Phase 1 districts is 0.51 percentage
points (ppts). This indicates that the proportion of lone parents not on benefit 12
months after first becoming potentially eligible for the pilots is 0.51 ppts higher for
lone parents living in the pilot districts in Phase 1 districts than it is for lone parents
living in the comparison districts.
The point estimates suggest that the impact was greater in the Phase 3 districts than
for districts in the other two Phases: after 12 months, the estimated (OLS) impacts
are respectively 0.51 ppts, 0.25 ppts and 1.20 ppts in Phases 1 to 3 (note that this
difference exists after the analysis has controlled for many characteristics of the local
areas and lone parents in the different Phases, but this variation between Phases
may reflect a difference that has not been adequately controlled for). The weighted
average of the three estimates is 0.6 ppts, so this is the central estimate of the
additional impact of the LPPs on the fraction of lone parents in the stock sample that
have left benefits in the pilot districts 12 months after the pilots had started. In
addition, in all pilot districts, the point estimates increase over time. This is consistent
with Section 5.1 which showed that participation in IWC rose over time.
The estimated impacts of the pilots on work outcomes are similar in magnitude (to
those found for benefit outcomes), also tend to be statistically significantly different
from zero, also rise over time, and also suggest that the impact was greater in the
Phase 3 districts than for districts in the other two Phases: in the Phase 3 districts, the
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across Phases. It is possible to calculate a weighted average of the impacts in
each Phase (weighted by their respective size), but it is not possible to estimate
a standard error on this number.
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OLS estimates suggest that the LPPs led to 1.11 ppts more lone parents entering
work in the pilot districts than in the comparison districts, six months after the pilots
were introduced.
Note that for all estimated impacts (both work and benefit), there is little difference
between the estimates produced using OLS and those produced using the (more
flexible) FILM procedure.
Table 5.1 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit,
stock sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
Phase 1
3 2.7 -0.16 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.11 (0.15)
6 4.4 -0.50 (0.18)*** -0.01 (0.19) -0.04 (0.19)
9 7.5 -0.68 (0.23)*** 0.16 (0.23) 0.10 (0.24)
12 9.8 -0.10 (0.25) 0.51 (0.25)** 0.44 (0.26)*
15 11.7 -0.70 (0.26)*** 0.45 (0.27)* 0.37 (0.27)
18 13.2 -0.56 (0.28)** 0.74 (0.28)*** 0.74 (0.29)***
21 15.4 -0.43 (0.29) 0.86 (0.30)*** 0.86 (0.30)***
24 17.1 -0.10 (0.30) 1.20 (0.30)*** 1.23 (0.31)***
Phase 2
3 3.6 -0.20 (0.11)* 0.06 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11)
6 6.3 -0.038 (0.15)*** -0.00 (0.14) 0.00 (0.15)
9 9.0 -0.41 (0.17)** 0.15 (0.17) 0.13 (0.17)
12 11.3 -0.49 (0.19)*** 0.25 (0.19) 0.23 (0.19)
15 13.8 -0.26 (0.20) 0.62 (0.20)*** 0.55 (0.20)***
Phase 3
3 2.2 0.31 (0.11)*** 0.45 (0.11)*** 0.47 (0.12)***
6 4.5 0.26 (0.14)* 0.65 (0.15)*** 0.70 (0.16)***
9 6.8 0.65 (0.17)*** 1.16 (0.18)*** 1.17 (0.20)***
12 9.2 0.55 (0.19)*** 1.20 (0.20)*** 1.20 (0.21)***
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
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Table 5.2 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work, stock
sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
Phase 1
3 11.9 -0.69 (0.26)*** 0.21 (0.17) 0.14 (0.17)
6 12.9 -0.70 (0.27)*** 0.26 (0.20) 0.20 (0.20)
9 14.1 -0.90 (0.28)*** 0.21 (0.21) 0.12 (0.22)
12 15.0 -0.94 (0.28)*** 0.20 (0.23) 0.10 (0.23)
15 15.8 -0.37 (0.29) 0.67 (0.25)*** 0.52 (0.26)**
18 16.7 -0.13 (0.29) 0.92 (0.26)*** 0.76 (0.27)***
Phase 2
3 12.9 -0.46 (0.20)** 0.23 (0.12)** 0.21 (0.12)*
6 14.2 -0.43 (0.21)** 0.34 (0.14)** 0.29 (0.14)**
9 15.1 -0.54 (0.21)** 0.35 (0.15)** 0.27 (0.16)*
12 16.0 -0.35 (0.21) 0.61 (0.17)*** 0.51 (0.17)***
Phase 3
3 12.6 -0.88 (0.21)*** 0.74 (0.13)*** 0.67 (0.14)***
6 13.4 -0.46 (0.21)** 1.11 (0.15)*** 1.01 (0.16)***
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
5.3.2 Impact estimates: flow sample
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present impact estimates of the LPPs (in percentage point terms)
for the flow sample on work and benefit outcomes three, six, nine and 12 months20
after the lone parent first became potentially eligible for pilots, alongside the mean
outcome for the pilot group.
The estimated impacts of the pilots on benefit outcomes, averaged across all
districts, are small in magnitude and never statistically significantly different from
The additional impact of the lone parent pilots on work and benefit receipt
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six, nine and 12, work outcomes are only available in all months for individuals
living in the Phase 1 districts. This is because individuals living in Phase 2 and 3
districts became potentially eligible for the pilots later than individuals living in
the Phase 1 districts, while the cut-off point for the availability of employment
information from the WPLS is the same for everyone. Benefit outcomes after
15 months are available for some individuals in the Phase 1 and 2 districts, and
after 18 and 21 months for some individuals in the Phase 1 districts, but these
estimates are not shown because the sample sizes are too small.
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zero, such that the idea that the pilots had no overall effect cannot be rejected (as a
guide to how to interpret these results, the fourth row of the first table in Table 5.3
shows that the OLS DiD impact estimate of the LPPs is 0.24 ppts. This indicates that
the proportion of lone parents not on benefit 12 months after first becoming
potentially eligible for the pilots is 0.24 ppts higher for lone parents living in the pilot
districts (as a whole) than it is for lone parents living in the comparison districts,
although this difference is not statistically different from zero).
The results for individual phases are also almost always statistically insignificant,
although the point estimates suggest that the impact was generally negative in
Phases 1 and 3 (meaning that lone parents living in pilot districts were less likely –
although not significantly so – to not be receiving benefits than lone parents living in
comparison districts). But the estimates for the Phase 2 districts are positive (and
significantly different from zero nine months after the date on which lone parents
become potentially eligible for the lone parent pilots).
The negative point estimates in Phases 1 and 3 could reflect a number of things:
• through mechanisms that are not clear, the pilots may be having genuinely
negative impacts on benefit outcomes (Chapter 3 argued that the WSP might
lead to negative impacts on benefit outcomes, but none of the districts in Phase
3 is operating WSP);
• the impact of the pilots may be genuinely positive, but very small, such that it is
not being detected by the methods used (note that almost all of the negative
estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero);
• There have been adverse changes to the local labour markets in Phase 1 and 3
districts – or adverse changes in the characteristics (that may potentially affect
labour market outcomes) of lone parents who are potentially eligible to the LPPs
in these districts – that have not been adequately reflected by the data available:
these changes are instead being attributed to the pilots (this would mean that
the ‘common trends’ assumption which the DiD estimator relies upon is not, in
fact, appropriate).
The estimated impacts of the pilots on work outcomes, averaged across all districts,
are slightly greater than those found for benefit outcomes, averaged across all
districts, and are sometimes statistically significantly different from zero. For
example, six months after first becoming potentially eligible for the LPPs, lone
parents living in pilot districts are 0.61 ppts more likely to be in work than lone
parents living in comparison districts. The substantial difference between this and
the impact estimate implied by the raw differences (in outcomes of individuals living
in the pilot and comparison districts) highlights the importance of controlling for
background characteristics in this evaluation.
The impact estimates for individual phases are generally statistically insignificant – at
least in part because the smaller sample size in an individual Phase makes it harder to
estimate small impacts precisely – although the results provide some evidence of
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negative impacts on individuals living in the Phase 3 districts, and small positive
impacts on individuals living in Phase 1 and 2 districts. For lone parents living in the
Phase 1 districts, therefore, there is a disparity between the impact of the LPPs on
benefit and work outcomes.
Table 5.3 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit,
flow sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
All Phases
3 5.2 -0.16 (0.18) -0.16 (0.19) -0.29 (0.20)
6 9.4 0.01 (0.23) 0.07 (0.25) -0.05 (0.26)
9 12.7 0.07 (0.30) 0.25 (0.32) 0.02 (0.34)
12 15.2 0.25 (0.37) 0.24 (0.41) -0.22 (0.44)
Phase 1
3 4.4 -0.89 (0.31)*** -0.66 (0.30)** -0.87 (0.84)
6 8.2 -0.64 (0.41) -0.28 (0.40) 0.00 (0.00)
9 11.2 -0.91 (0.50)* -0.39 (0.50) -1.28 (0.97)
12 13.6 -1.08 (0.59)* -0.37 (0.59) -2.58 (1.92)
Phase 2
3 6.3 0.14 (0.25) 0.21 (0.24) 1.13 (0.97)
6 10.9 0.37 (0.33) 0.49 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00)
9 14.5 0.46 (0.42) 0.84 (0.40)** -0.04 (1.55)
12 17.1 0.04 (0.52) 0.73 (0.51) 4.66 (3.39)
Phase 3
3 4.3 -0.20 (0.34) -0.42 (0.34) -0.53 (0.35)
6 8.1 0.10 (0.43) -0.45 (0.44) -0.50 (0.46)
9 11.4 0.18 (0.66) -0.42 (0.66) -0.53 (0.68)
12 14.7 0.78 (2.67) -1.61 (2.56) -1.94 (2.57)
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
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Table 5.4 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work, flow
sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
All Phases
3 20.2 -1.94 (0.32)*** 0.20 (0.20) 0.20 (0.21)
6 20.8 -1.88 (0.38)*** 0.61 (0.29)** 0.37 (0.30)
9 20.0 -2.48 (0.47)*** 0.71 (0.41)* 0.56 (0.43)
12 20.1 -3.63 (0.63)*** 0.28 (0.64) 0.27 (0.66)
Phase 1
3 17.8 -3.20 (0.51)*** 0.22 (0.30) 0.83 (0.61)
6 18.6 -3.02 (0.57)*** 0.35 (0.40) -0.29 (1.39)
9 19.1 -2.20 (0.65)*** 0.76 (0.51)
12 20.1 -3.63 (0.63)*** 0.28 (0.64)
Phase 2
3 22.1 0.03 (0.44) 0.26 (0.25) -0.82 (1.14)
6 23.3 0.48 (0.53) 0.77 (0.36)** 0.35 (2.53)
9 22.2 0.53 (0.80) 0.64 (0.61)
Phase 3
3 21.3 -1.21 (0.73)* -0.08 (0.43) -0.12 (0.44)
6 25.6 2.76 (2.84) -2.13 (1.90) 1.84 (1.91)
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
5.3.3 Impact estimates: conclusion
The estimates presented in this section are consistent with the pilots having small,
positive impacts on both work and benefit outcomes on average. For the stock
sample, an average of 0.6 ppts (ranging from 0.25 ppts in the Phase 2 districts to
1.20 ppts in the Phase 3 districts) more lone parents have left benefit after 12
months of being potentially eligible to the lone parent pilots, rising to 1.20 ppts after
24 months of being potentially eligible to the lone parent pilots in the Phase 1
districts; between 0.26 and 1.11 ppts more are in work six months after the
introduction of the LPPs. After 12 months exposure to the pilots, 0.24 ppts more
lone parents from the flow sample have left benefit and 0.28 ppts more are in work,
but neither of these numbers are statistically significant from zero.
Estimates from the stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots is greater for
Phase 3 districts than it is for Phase 1 or Phase 2 districts; estimates from the flow
sample provide weak evidence that the impact of the pilots is greater for Phase 2
districts than it is for Phase 1 or Phase 3 districts. These differences exist after the
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analysis has controlled for many characteristics of the local areas and lone parents in
the different Phases, but this variation between Phases may reflect differences that
have not been adequately controlled for. Estimates from the stock sample suggest
that the impact of the pilots increased over time, consistent with estimates of the
proportion of potentially eligible lone parents who have ever received IWC (shown in
Section 5.1), but this pattern was not evident in the flow sample.
How do these percentage point impacts translate into numbers of lone parents?
Details of the number of lone parents potentially eligible to the lone parent pilots
and in the sample were given in chapter 4. 191,369 lone parents were potentially
eligible to the LPPs and in the stock sample, and 38,560 lone parents were
potentially eligible to the LPPs and in the flow sample.21 Of the 38,560 lone parents
in the flow sample, 5,861 (15.2 per cent) were not receiving out-of-work benefits a
year after first becoming eligible. The central estimate is that the LPPs were
responsible for just under a hundred (93) of these lone parents. Of the 191,369 lone
parents in the stock sample, around 19,500 (10.2 per cent) are no longer receiving
out-of-work benefits a year later, and the central estimate is that the LPPs were
responsible for around 800 of these. It is possible to look at longer-term outcomes
only in the Phase 1 districts: after 24 months of operation in the Phase 1 districts,
7,245 of the 42,374 lone parents in the stock sample and potentially eligible to the
LPPs are no longer on out-of-work benefits, and the central estimate is that the LPPs
are directly responsible for 508 of those. The central estimates imply, therefore, that
after 12 months of being eligible to the lone parent pilots, flows off benefit have
increased by 1.6 per cent for the flow sample, and by 4.1 per cent for the stock
sample, although the estimate for the flow sample is not statistically significant from
zero. After 24 months, the flow rate off benefit in the Phase 1 districts for the stock
sample had increased by seven per cent.
The next section provides more detailed analysis of the impact of the LPPs by
investigating whether the impact varied according to whether the district was
operating New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP), and for different types of lone
parents.
5.4 Impact estimates for different districts and different
types of lone parents
Section 5.3 presented impact estimates separately for each Phase of the LPPs, and
across all pilot districts (the latter for the flow sample only). In this section, further
understanding of what is driving these overall estimates is sought by investigating
The additional impact of the lone parent pilots on work and benefit receipt
21 These numbers will be slightly lower than the number of lone parents actually
eligible to the lone parent pilots because some claims of IS in the administrative
data could not be included in our sample if certain variables in the database
were missing or incomplete (most notably postcode, as described in Appendices
A and B).
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the extent to which impacts vary according to whether Jobcentre Plus districts are
operating ND+fLP, and by whether the impact of the pilots vary between different
groups of lone parents. The different groups of lone parents were defined by:
• previously participation in New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP): lone parents on
NDLP are likely to be more work-ready than others, and also more likely to know
about IWC through their contact with their personal advisor;
• sex of the lone parent;
• age of the youngest dependent child;
• number of dependent children;
• month in which the lone parent became potentially eligible for the LPPs (for the
flow sample only).
5.4.1 Impact estimates according to whether operating ND+fLP
For the flow sample, all pilot districts were classified according to whether they were
(or will be) operating ND+fLP. In fact, ND+fLP did not start until April 2005, hence
the estimates of the impact of the LPPs in the ND+fLP districts are really averages of
the actual impact of ND+fLP, plus the impact in those districts in the six or 12 months
before ND+fLP started.
This analysis is more complicated for the stock samples, because it is necessary to
analyse each Phase separately (Chapter 4 pointed out that the analysis uses a
different comparison sample for each Phase). All Phase 1 districts offered ND+fLP,
some Phase 2 districts offered ND+fLP and none of the Phase 3 districts offered
ND+fLP. This means that there are two estimates of the impact of ND+fLP: one for
the Phase 1 districts as a whole, and one for Leicestershire and Dudley & Sandwell
combined (Phase 2). In addition, there are two estimates of the impact of not
offering ND+fLP: one for the remaining English districts in Phase 2 (Central London,
Lancashire West, Leeds, Staffordshire and West London), and one for the Phase 3
districts as a whole.
Tables 5.5 and 5.7 present the two estimates of the impact of ND+fLP for the stock
samples (one for the Phase 1 districts, and one for the Phase 2 districts of
Leicestershire and Dudley & Sandwell combined), for benefit and work outcomes
respectively. Tables 5.6 and 5.8 present estimates for the same outcomes for the
two sets of districts not offering ND+fLP (one for the remaining English districts in
Phase 2, and one for Phase 3 districts).
The impact estimates on both benefit and work outcomes for the stock samples
suggest that the impact of the pilots has been greater in the non-ND+fLP districts:
for example, for the Phase 1 districts (operating ND+fLP), there is a difference of 0.51
ppts in the proportion of lone parents who have moved off benefits 12 months after
the introduction of the pilots (compared to the proportion of lone parents who have
moved off benefits in the comparison districts), while for the Phase 3 (non-ND+fLP
districts), the estimate is 1.20 ppts.
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It should be noted, however, that much of this difference is because, as shown in
Section 6.2, the estimated impacts of the pilots on the stock sample in the Phase 3
districts are generally larger than those for districts in the other Phases. Nonetheless,
even if outcomes are only considered amongst the Phase 2 districts, the point
estimates are still larger in the non-ND+fLP districts than in those offering ND+fLP:
for example, the proportion of lone parents who are in work 12 months after the
introduction of the pilots is -0.30 ppts in the Phase 2 ND+fLP districts, compared
with 0.89 ppts in the Phase 2 non-ND+fLP districts.22
Table 5.5 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit in
ND+fLP districts, stock sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
Phase 1 (all ND+fLP districts)
3 2.7 -0.16 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.11 (0.15)
6 4.4 -0.50 (0.18)*** -0.01 (0.19) -0.04 (0.19)
9 7.5 -0.68 (0.23)*** 0.16 (0.23) 0.10 (0.24)
12 9.8 -0.10 (0.25) 0.51 (0.25)** 0.44 (0.26)*
15 11.7 -0.70 (0.26)*** 0.45 (0.27)* 0.37 (0.27)
18 13.2 -0.56 (0.28)** 0.74 (0.28)*** 0.74 (0.29)***
21 15.4 -0.43 (0.29) 0.86 (0.30)*** 0.86 (0.30)***
24 17.1 -0.10 (0.30) 1.20 (0.30)*** 1.23 (0.31)***
Sample size 42,374
Phase 2, ND+fLP districts
3 4.09 -0.12 (0.22) 0.00 (0.21) 0.00 (0.21)
6 7.24 -0.27 (0.28) -0.11 (0.27) -0.11 (0.27)
9 10.26 -0.50 (0.33) -0.31 (0.32) -0.33 (0.32)
12 12.72 -0.59 (0.36) * -0.33 (0.30) -0.35 (0.35)
15 15.75 0.02 (0.39) 0.30 (0.37) 0.25 (0.38)
Sample size 17,876
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
22 Obviously, the characteristics of these districts might be different, but, provided
such differences are either constant over time, or reflected in the variables in
our dataset, then this will have been controlled for in the difference-in-differences
estimator.
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Table 5.6 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit in
non-ND+fLP districts, stock sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
Phase 2 (non-ND+fLP
districts)
3 3.44 -0.22 (0.13)* 0.08 (0.12) -3.26 (0.76)***
6 6.03 -0.42 (0.16)*** 0.03 (0.16) -3.21 (1.00)***
9 8.60 -0.39 (0.19)** 0.29 (0.19) -3.30(1.20)***
12 10.84 -0.46 (0.21)** 0.42 (0.21)** -4.68 (1.30)***
15 13.24 -0.35 (0.22) 0.72 (0.22)*** -3.17 (1.39)**
Sample size 59,414
Phase 3 (all non-ND+fLP
districts)
3 2.2 0.31 (0.11)*** 0.45 (0.11)*** 0.47 (0.12)***
6 4.5 0.26 (0.14)* 0.65 (0.15)*** 0.70 (0.16)***
9 6.8 0.65 (0.17)*** 1.16 (0.18)*** 1.17 (0.20)***
12 9.2 0.55 (0.19)*** 1.20 (0.20)*** 1.20 (0.21)***
Sample size 71,705
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
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Table 5.7 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work in
ND+fLP districts, stock sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
Phase 1 (all ND+fLP
districts)
3 11.9 -0.69 (0.26)*** 0.21 (0.17) 0.14 (0.17)
6 12.9 -0.70 (0.27)*** 0.26 (0.20) 0.20 (0.20)
9 14.1 -0.90 (0.28)*** 0.21 (0.21) 0.12 (0.22)
12 15.0 -0.94 (0.28)*** 0.20 (0.23) 0.10 (0.23)
15 15.8 -0.37 (0.29) 0.67 (0.25)*** 0.52 (0.26)**




3 13.54 -0.16 (0.38) -0.08 (0.22) -0.08 (0.22)
6 14.83 -0.29 (0.40) -0.16 (0.27) - 0.19 (0.27)
9 15.70 -0.67 (0.40)* -0.46 (0.29) -0.51 (0.29)*
12 16.67 -0.54 (0.41) -0.30 (0.31) -0.35 (0.31)
Sample size 17,876
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
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Table 5.8 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work in non-
ND+fLP districts, stock sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Raw
after months  pilot group difference OLS FILM
Phase 2 (non-ND+fLP
districts)
3 12.74 -0.55 (0.22)** 0.33 (0.14)** -0.57 (0.84)
6 13.98 -0.47 (0.23)** 0.51 (0.16)*** -0.11 (1.00)
9 14.92 -0.50 (0.24)** 0.60 (0.17)*** 0.75 (1.08)
12 15.80 -0.30 (0.24) 0.89 (0.19)*** -0.21 (1.17)
Sample size 59,414
Phase 3 (all non-ND+fLP
district)
3 12.6 -0.88 (0.21)*** 0.74 (0.13)*** 0.67 (0.14)***
6 13.4 -0.46 (0.21)** 1.11 (0.15)*** 1.01 (0.16)***
Sample size 71,705
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 indicate that there is little discernible difference between the
impact estimates for the flow sample in the districts offering ND+fLP compared to
those offering other LPP policies: almost all of the estimated coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable from zero (recall that Section 5.3 showed that the
estimated impact for the flow sample across all districts was statistically
indistinguishable from zero too).
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Table 5.9 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit in
ND+fLP districts compared to non-ND+fLP districts, flow
sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Sample size Raw
after months pilot group (pilot group) difference OLS FILM
ND+fLP districts
3 5.00 18,803 -0.70 (0.25)*** -0.21 (0.26) -0.39 (0.27)
6 9.14 18,803 -0.48 (0.33) 0.28 (0.34) 0.01 (0.36)
9 12.19 15,533 -0.90 (0.41)** 0.26 (0.42) -0.11 (0.45)
12 14.63 12,425 -1.07 (0.49)** 0.49 (0.51) -0.17 (0.54)
Non-ND+fLP districts
3 5.46 19,757 0.18 (0.22) -0.13 (0.22) -0.76 (1.02)
6 9.56 19,757 0.48 (0.29)* -0.07 (0.29) -1.17 (0.95)
9 13.29 12,721 0.84 (0.38)** 0.25 (0.39) -2.66 (1.43)*
12 16.20 6,383 0.89 (0.54)* -0.09 (0.57) -8.97 (5.56)
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
Table 5.10 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work in
ND+fLP districts compared to non-ND+fLP districts,
flow sample (ppts)
% off benefit Level for Sample size Raw
after months pilot group (pilot group) difference OLS FILM
ND+fLP districts
3 18.73 15,533 -2.73 (0.43)*** 0.13 (0.26) 0.14 (0.28)
6 19.43 12,425 -2.80 (0.49)*** 0.32 (0.35) 0.10 (0.37)
9 19.41 8,581 -2.32 (0.57)*** 0.87 (0.47) * 0.64 (0.49)
Non-ND+fLP districts
3 21.89 12,721 -0.45 (0.42) 0.25 (0.25) -1.10 (1.34)
6 23.33 6,383 0.54 (0.57) 1.02 (0.41)*** 1.75 (4.13)
9 22.18 2,408 -0.60 (0.88) 0.33 (0.69) -0.38 (2.10)
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
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This section has shown that the estimated impact of the pilots is slightly greater in
the non-ND+fLP districts than in those offering ND+fLP. However, this difference is:
• only apparent in the stock sample;
• derived from data from the first 12 months of operation of ND+fLP combined
with the 6 to 12 months before that; and
• is very small in magnitude.
5.4.2 Impact estimates for different groups of lone parents
This section analyses whether the LPPs had a differential impact on lone parents with
differing histories of participation in NDLP, and then briefly discusses outcomes for
other subgroups; full tables of results are given in Appendix L.
To analyse the impact of NDLP participation on the impact of the LPPs, lone parents
were split into three groups:
• those who did not participate in NDLP in the period six–30 months before
becoming potentially eligible to the LPPs;23
• those who had recently participated in NDLP before becoming potentially eligible
to the LPPs (where recently is defined as in the period six–12 months before
becoming potentially eligible to the LPPs);
• those who had not recently participated in NDLP, but had at some point in the
past participated in NDLP (defined as having participated in NDLP in the period
12-30 months before becoming potentially eligible to the LPPs).
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 provide results for benefit and work outcomes respectively. For
benefit outcomes, the point estimates from the flow sample and for the stock
samples in Phases 2 and 3 suggest that the impact was smaller for those lone parents
with no history of NDLP participation than for those with some. For the flow sample
and for the Phase 3 stock sample, the impact was the greatest amongst lone parents
with a history of recent participation in NDLP: for example, after 12 months, lone
parents living in a pilot district (in the flow sample) were 3.38 ppts more likely to have
stopped claiming benefits than lone parents living in one of the comparison districts.
For work outcomes, this pattern is only repeated for the stock sample in the Phase 3
districts; for the stock sample in Phases 1 and 2, the point estimates suggest that the
impact is greatest for those lone parents with no history of NDLP participation, and
there is no consistent pattern for the flow sample.
23 Note that because receipt of IWC/WSP was initially conditional on joining NDLP,
it was important to try and separate voluntary participation in NDLP from
participation primarily to take advantage of the LPPs. This was done by ignoring
participation in NDLP in the six months immediately prior to becoming potentially
eligible to the LPPs in order to try and eliminate any reverse causation that
would occur if lone parents joined NDLP with a view to becoming eligible for
the LPPs in future.
61
It is also unclear how to interpret any variation in these estimates by NDLP
participation. Because NDLP is a voluntary programme, it might be expected that
those lone parents who join it are those who are more likely to leave benefit and
enter work (indeed, this pattern is strongly suggested by data from the comparison
districts), so there may be selection effects: those lone parents who are naturally
predisposed to respond to financial incentives may be the ones that join NDLP, and
therefore any positive impact of IWC on all lone parents’ outcomes is concentrated
amongst this group. In addition, it may be that those lone parents with a recent
history of NDLP participation are more likely to have heard about IWC before they
found a job through meetings with their personal adviser (the qualitative research
on the LPPs may be informative about this issue), so these differences may reflect
informational effects. In reality, of course, both effects may be operating.
Table 5.11 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit,
by recent participation in NDLP (ppts)
% off benefit after months Never Recently In the past
Flow sample, all phases
3 -0.34 (0.20)* 1.02 (0.61)* 0.34 (0.57)
6 -0.14 (0.27) 1.82 (0.80)** 0.30 (0.75)
9 -0.06 (0.34) 2.41 (1.01)** 0.90 (0.95)
12 -0.23 (0.44) 3.38 (1.27)*** 1.16 (1.17)
Sample size1 31,753 3,448 3,359
Stock sample, phase 1
3 0.19 (0.15) -0.87 (0.61) -0.61 (0.60)
6 -0.00 (0.20) -1.15 (0.80) 0.21 (0.79)
9 0.15 (0.24) -1.29 (0.98) 0.64 (0.97)
12 0.40 (0.26) -0.49 (1.06) 1.97 (1.06)*
15 0.39 (0.28) -1.61 (1.13) 1.56 (1.12)
18 0.69 (0.29)* -1.08 (1.19) 1.42 (1.18)
21 0.76 (0.31) -0.38 (1.26) 1.91 (1.25)
24 1.13 (0.32) -0.23 (1.29) 1.79 (1.28)
Sample size 37,846 2,559 1,969
Stock sample, phase 2
3 -0.02 (0.12) 0.43 (0.44) 0.85 (0.45)
6 -0.07 (0.15) 0.75 (0.57) 0.27 (0.59)
9 0.05 (0.18) 0.93 (0.69) 0.71 (0.71)
12 0.15 (0.20) 0.89 (0.75) 0.85 (0.77)
15 0.55 (0.21)*** 0.58 (0.80) 1.63 (0.82)**
Sample size 67,945 5,004 4,341
Continued
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Table 5.11 Continued
% off benefit after months Never Recently In the past
Stock sample, phase 3
3 0.45 (0.12)*** 0.93 (0.44)** 0.29 (0.44)
6 0.61 (0.16)*** 1.66 (0.60)*** 0.85 (0.59)
9 1.03 (0.19)*** 2.88 (0.72)*** 2.37 (0.72)***
12 1.07 (0.21)*** 3.10 (0.79)*** 1.87 (0.79)**
Sample size 62,702 5,014 3,989
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
1 Note that the sample size quoted here is for the flow sample at 91 days. This figure will
necessarily decrease over time, although there is no reason to expect that the relative sizes of the
different categories will alter.
Table 5.12 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work, by
recent participation in NDLP (ppts)
% off benefit after months Never Recently In the past
Flow sample, all phases
3 0.19 (0.22) -0.55 (0.64) 0.73 (0.60)
6 0.54 (0.31) 0.75 (0.89) 0.68 (0.83)
9 0.79 (0.44) 0.38 (1.25) -0.09 (1.16)
12 0.18 (0.68) -0.02 (1.85) 0.60 (1.68)
Sample size1 23,194 2,543 2,517
Stock sample, phase 1
3 0.15 (0.18) -0.80 (0.72) 0.85 (0.71)
6 0.27 (0.21) -2.43 (0.84)*** 1.00 (0.83)
9 0.24 (0.22) -2.62 (0.91)*** 0.75 (0.90)
12 0.15 (0.24) -1.57 (0.98) 1.43 (0.97)
15 0.56 (0.26)** 0.54 (1.07) 1.41 (1.06)
18 0.84 (0.27)*** 0.99 (1.11) 0.88 (1.10)
Sample size 37,846 2,559 1,969
Continued
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Table 5.12 Continued
% off benefit after months Never Recently In the past
Stock sample, phase 2
3 0.24 (0.13)* -0.20 (0.48) 0.36 (0.50)
6 0.35 (0.15)** 0.31 (0.57) 0.11 (0.59)
9 0.40 (0.16)** -0.59 (0.62) 0.31 (0.64)
12 0.64 (0.18)*** 0.18 (0.67) 0.51 (0.69)
Sample size 67,945 5,004 4,341
Stock sample, phase 3
3 0.67 (0.14)*** 1.39 (0.51)*** 1.00 (0.51)**
6 1.03 (0.16)*** 2.57 (0.59)*** 1.04 (0.59)*
Sample size 62,702 5,014 3,989
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text: OLS estimates only.
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Please note that the results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -
0.16 means -0.16 ppts, not - 16ppts.
1 Note that the sample size quoted here is for the flow sample at 91 days. This figure will
necessarily decrease over time, although there is no reason to expect that the relative sizes of the
different categories will alter.
This section has shown that for the stock sample in the Phase 3 districts, there is
some evidence that the impact of the LPPs on both work and benefit outcomes is
greatest amongst lone parents who have recently (in the six to 12 months prior to
becoming eligible for the LPPs) participated in NDLP (and that these estimates are
typically higher than those found for the LPPs overall): this is also true for the flow
sample in terms of benefit outcomes. For the stock sample in Phases 1 and 2, there
seems to be some evidence that the impact is greatest amongst those who have
never participated in NDLP (at least in terms of work outcomes), and it is difficult to
think of mechanisms that may lead to this (as ever, such differences are very small in
magnitude).
5.4.3 Impact estimates: other variation
The vast majority of potentially eligible lone parents are female, thus it is unsurprising
that the only statistically significant estimated impacts are for female lone parents.
This is partly because the small number of male lone parents means that it is difficult
to reliably estimate small impacts, although there is some evidence that the actual
impact may well be larger for women than men (at least for the stock samples). For
example, female lone parents in the Phase 3 stock sample are 1.24 ppts more likely
to have left benefits after 12 months than female lone parents in the comparison
group; for men, this difference is only 0.84 ppts (Tables L.1 and L.2).
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Tables L.3 and L.4 show how the estimated impact varies by age of youngest child
(measured at the date on which the lone parent first became potentially eligible for
the pilots). There are few consistent patterns, although the tables suggest a general
tendency for the impact of the LPPs on benefit outcomes to rise with age of youngest
child; however, this pattern is only evident on the work outcomes of the Phase 3
stock sample. There is also some suggestion that the impact of the pilots on work
outcomes is consistently high for lone parents whose youngest child is between five
and eight years old, but this is not repeated for benefit outcomes, making it hard to
draw conclusions from these results. The estimated impact for those lone parents
whose youngest child is aged 11 or more will be partially affected by Quarterly Work
Focused Interviews (QWFIs), which affect a subset of this group. However, this
report has not formally examined the additional impact of QWFIs.
Tables L.5 and L.6 show how the estimated impact varies by number of dependant
children (measured at the date on which the lone parent first became potentially
eligible for the pilots). For the flow sample and the Phase 1 stock sample, the point
estimates suggest larger impacts for larger families, but for the other two stock
samples (Phases 2 and 3) suggest the opposite: these patterns are similar for work
and benefit outcomes. It should be emphasised, however, that few of these
differences will be statistically significant, so these patterns should only be taken as
suggestive evidence.
For the flow sample, it is possible to investigate whether the impact of the pilots
differs across cohorts of lone parents, where cohorts are defined according to the
quarter in which the lone parent became potentially eligible to the LPPs (it is not
possible to do this for the stock sample because, by construction, all lone parents in
the stock sample became potentially eligible to the LPPs on the same day – the day
the pilots became operational in that district). In this analysis, quarters are measured
relative to the date that the pilots went live in the relevant district, so lone parents in
cohort 1 became potentially eligible for the LPPs within three months of the pilots
starting in their district (note that only Phase 1 districts can contribute to the
estimates for quarters 5 and 6). Tables L.7 and L.8 provide the results, which show
little evidence of any consistent patterns, with almost all estimates being statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Indeed, the estimated impacts on the benefit and work
outcomes contradict one another, with the early cohorts showing negative impacts
on the benefit outcomes and positive impacts on the work outcomes.
5.4.4 Impact estimates: conclusion
This section has investigated whether the impact of the LPPs varies by subgroup.
Because the estimated impacts of the LPPs are small, and only statistically
distinguishable from zero for the stock sample, it is very rare to find statistically
significant differences between these groups. However, by comparing point
estimates, there seems to be weak evidence that the impact of the LPPs is greater:
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• for non-ND+fLP districts (although only for the stock sample);
• amongst lone parents who have recently participated in NDLP;
• for female lone parents than male (although only for the stock sample);
• the older is the youngest child of the lone parent;
There was no consistent variation according to the quarter in which a lone parent
became potentially eligible to the LPPs, nor by the number of children.
5.5 Conclusions and interpretations
This chapter has presented evidence on the impact of the LPPs on the proportion of
potentially eligible lone parents who have left benefits or entered work.
In the absence of the LPPs, lone parents in the pilot districts are, on average, slower
to leave benefits and spend less time in work than those in comparison districts, and
individuals in the flow sample leave benefits more quickly and spend more time in
work than those in the stock sample. There are problems in using the measure of
work in the WPLS, chiefly because it relies on employers making accurate returns to
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) when they start and stop paying an
employee sufficient earnings for Income Tax to be liable. For example, on the date
that individuals first become eligible for the LPPs, between 11 per cent (of the stock)
and 21 per cent (of the flow) are recorded as being in work. Although it is possible to
be both in work and receiving IS, this proportion seems rather high. On the other
hand, changes over time in the measure of work look more plausible.
Impact estimates were presented for each Phase (Section 5.3). The estimates are
consistent with the pilots having small, positive impacts on both work and benefit
outcomes on average. For the stock sample, an average of 0.6 ppts (ranging from
0.25 ppts in the Phase 2 districts to 1.20 ppts in the Phase 3 districts) more lone
parents have left benefit after 12 months, rising to 1.20 ppts after 24 months in the
Phase 1 districts, and between 0.26 and 1.11 ppts more of the stock sample are in
work six months after the introduction of the lone parent pilots. After 12 months
exposure to the pilots, 0.24 ppts more lone parents from the flow sample have left
benefit and 0.28 ppts more are in work, but neither of these figures is statistically
significant from zero.
The central estimate implies that the LPPs were directly responsible for just under a
hundred (93) of the 5,861 lone parents in the flow sample who were no longer
receiving out-of-work benefits 12 months after becoming potentially eligible to the
LPPs, and that the LPPs were directly responsible for around 800 of the 19,500 lone
parents in the stock sample who were no longer receiving out-of-work benefits a
year after becoming potentially eligible to the LPPs. In other words, the central
estimates imply that, after 12 months, the LPPs have increased the number of lone
parents no longer receiving out-of-work benefits by 1.6 per cent for the flow
sample, and by 4.1 per cent for the stock sample; after 24 months, this figure has
risen to seven per cent for the stock sample in the Phase 1 districts.
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There is weak evidence that the impacts are slightly greater in districts which do not
operate ND+fLP, but this difference is:
• only apparent in the stock sample;
• derived from data from the first 12 months of operation of ND+fLP combined
with the six to 12 months before that; and
• very small in magnitude.
There is weak evidence that the impacts are slightly greater for lone parents with
some history of participation in NDLP. Because NDLP is a voluntary programme, it
might be expected that those lone parents who join it are those who are more likely
to leave benefit and enter work so those lone parents who are naturally predisposed
to respond to financial incentives may be the ones that join NDLP, and therefore any
positive impact of IWC on all lone parents’ outcomes is concentrated amongst this
group. In addition, it may be that those lone parents with a recent history of NDLP
participation are more likely to have heard about IWC before they found a job
through meetings with their personal adviser, so these differences may reflect
informational effects.
There is weak evidence that the impacts are slightly greater for female lone parents,
and for lone parents whose youngest children is relatively older (Section 5.4).
The proportion of potentially eligible lone parents who have received IWC has risen
over time, and is continuing to rise in the Phase 1 districts after 20 months of
operation (Section 5.1). In the long-run, this proportion should be stable, which
suggests that the pilots may be taking some time to become fully effective, either
through delays in lone parents discovering that they are potentially eligible for IWC,
or delays in the ability of Jobcentre Plus staff to market IWC effectively: the data here
cannot distinguish between these or alternative explanations. But this rise in the
proportion of potentially eligible lone parents who have ever received IWC may
indicate that the impact of the LPPs on labour market outcomes might also be rising
over time, and continuing to rise even after the data analysed here stops (31 March
2006 for the benefit outcomes, 30 September 2005 for the work outcomes). On the
other hand, data from the flow sample failed to find any statistically significant
differences between different cohorts of lone parents.
As a whole, therefore, the evidence in this report suggests that, in its first one to two
years of operation, the main achievement of the pilots was to make better off those
lone parents who would have left benefits for work had the pilots not been in
operation, rather than to encourage substantially more lone parents to do just that.
The pilots may well be encouraging job retention amongst this group, but it is not
possible to examine this without data on which lone parents received IWC.
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6 Conclusions and lessons
for future analysis
The aim of this project is to quantitatively evaluate the short- and long-run impacts
of a set of policies designed to help lone parents into work, hereafter referred to as
the lone parent pilots (LPPs). This report has described the first stage of that project.
6.1 Methodology and data
The analysis in this report has estimated the impact of being potentially eligible for
the LPPs on whether individuals with an Income Support (IS)/Jobseeker’s Allowance
(JSA) claim of at least 12 months have stopped claiming benefits and whether they
are in work at various points following the introduction of the pilots. This was done
by comparing the outcomes of lone parents living in the pilot districts with the
outcomes of lone parents living in other (English) districts (the comparison group).
This evaluation was constrained to use administrative data held by the Department
for Work and Pensions (DWP), and used the Income Support History file (IS History
file) and the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) to create a 100 per cent
sample of individuals potentially affected by the LPPs (and a set for the comparison
group).
Information was used on all lone parents with an IS/JSA claim that had, at some point
between 1 April 2002 and 31 March 2006, exceeded 12 months in duration. Data
from the same period was used to construct benefit outcomes, and employment
data from 1 April 2002 to 30 September 2005 was used to construct work outcomes
(data from before 1 April 2002 was used to construct benefit and employment
histories).
The report shows that estimates of the proportion of individuals reported to be in
work using the measure of employment available in the WPLS are not always
plausible. However, in general, changes in this measure (i.e. changes in the
proportion of lone parents reported to be in work) tend to match well with changes
in the proportion of lone parents who were receiving benefits (measured for the
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same individuals), indicating that this is a reasonable measure to use when
estimating the impact of the In Work Credit (IWC) in particular.
Some personal characteristics are available in the IS History file, the WPLS and the
National Benefits Database (NBD), but these were supplemented by local-area data
to proxy for individual characteristics that are not observed in the administrative
data. Local area data was also included to control for local labour market characteristics
(that may affect the likelihood of an individual finding work and/or leaving benefits).
This data was obtained from a variety of sources, including the 2001 Census.
Preliminary work indicated that, even after controlling for all of these individual-level
and local-area characteristics, however, lone parents in the pilot districts were still,
on average, slower to leave benefits and spent less time in work than those in the
comparison districts. This indicates that there are unobserved differences between
pilot and comparison districts that are likely to bias estimates of the impact of the
LPPs if they are ignored. If one is willing to accept the ‘common trends’ assumption,
then a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator can be used to estimate the impact
of the LPPs. Such an estimator compares trends in the outcomes of lone parents
living in the pilot districts with trends in the outcomes of lone parents living in the
comparison districts. If, after controlling for individual and local-area effects, the
average outcomes in these two groups converge or diverge, then this can be
attributed to the pilots. This will be a correct estimate of the true impact of the LPPs
only if the common trends assumption holds in practice, i.e. only if the trends in
labour market outcomes in the absence of any pilots is the same for lone parents in
the pilot and comparison districts. A DiD estimator can be implemented using either
linear methods (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Fully Interacted Linear Matching
(FILM)), or propensity score matching (PSM) techniques, but results are presented
only for linear methods in this report (large sample sizes meant that obtaining
standard errors using PSM techniques would have taken months of computation
time).
6.2 Impact estimates using difference-in-differences
Impact estimates of the LPPs were provided on the proportion of lone parents who
have stopped claiming benefits and the proportion of lone parents who are in work
at three-monthly intervals following the introduction of the LPPs. In all cases,
separate impact estimates are provided for:
• those who have been claiming IS/JSA continuously for at least 12 months when
the pilots are introduced in their district, such that they are potentially eligible
for the LPPs on the day they start. This group is referred to as the stock sample;
• those who have been claiming IS/JSA for less than 12 months, or who have not
yet made a claim for IS/JSA, when the pilots are introduced in their district. This
group is referred to as the flow sample.
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The flow is the more interesting sample, because the impact of the pilots on the flow
sample determines how effective the policies are likely to be in the long-run (in the
long-run, everyone in the stock sample will have stopped claiming benefits, such
that all IS/JSA claims potentially eligible to the pilots in the long-run will have first
become potentially eligible to the pilots after their introduction). However, the
larger sample size of the stock sample means that impacts were estimated more
accurately for this group.
The estimates suggest that, on average, the pilots had small, positive impacts on
both work and benefit outcomes. For the stock sample, an average of 0.6 ppts more
lone parents have left benefit after 12 months of being potentially eligible to the
LPPs, rising to 1.20 ppts after 24 months of being potentially eligible to the LPPs in
the Phase 1 districts; between 0.26 and 1.11 ppts more are in work six months after
the introduction of the LPPs. After 12 months exposure to the pilots, 0.24 ppts more
lone parents from the flow sample have left benefit and 0.28 ppts more are in work,
but neither of these numbers are statistically significant from zero.
In the absence of the pilots, lone parents on IS/JSA for at least 12 months tend to stay
on benefits for long durations, and this helps explain why these estimated impacts
seem small. The impact estimates imply that after 12 months of being eligible to the
LPPs, the number of lone parents not on benefit had increased by 4.1 per cent for the
stock sample and 1.6 per cent for the flow sample (although the latter is not
statistically significant from zero). After 24 months of being potentially eligible to
the pilots, the number in the stock sample and not on benefit in the Phase 1 districts
had increased by seven per cent.
Estimates from the stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots increased over
time, consistent with estimates of the proportion of potentially eligible lone parents
who have ever received IWC. This pattern was not evident in the flow sample.
Estimates from the stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots is greater for
Phase 3 districts than it is for Phase 1 or Phase 2 districts; estimates from the flow
sample provide weak evidence that the impact of the pilots is greater for Phase 2
districts than it is for Phase 1 or Phase 3 districts. These differences exist after the
analysis has controlled for many characteristics of the local areas and lone parents in
the different Phases, but this variation between Phases may reflect differences that
have not been adequately controlled for. But the differences are small, and not
always statistically significant. There is weak evidence that the impacts are slightly
greater in districts which do not operate New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP),
but this difference is only apparent in the stock sample, is derived from data from the
first 12 months of operation of ND+fLP combined with the six to 12 months before
that, and is very small in magnitude.
There is weak evidence that the impacts are slightly greater for lone parents with
some history of participation in New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP). Because NDLP is
a voluntary programme, it might be expected that those lone parents who join it are
those who are more likely to leave benefit and enter work so those lone parents who
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are naturally predisposed to respond to financial incentives may be the ones that join
NDLP, and therefore any positive impact of IWC on all lone parents’ outcomes is
concentrated amongst this group. In addition, it may be that those lone parents with
a recent history of NDLP participation are more likely to have heard about IWC
before they found a job through meetings with their personal adviser, so these
differences may reflect informational effects. There is also weak evidence that the
impacts are slightly greater for female lone parents, and for lone parents whose
youngest child is relatively older.
6.3 Policy implications
As a whole, the evidence in this report suggests that, in its first one to two years of
operation, the main achievement of the pilots was to make better off those lone
parents who would have left benefits for work had the pilots not been in operation,
rather than to encourage substantially more lone parents to do just that. The pilots
may well be encouraging job retention amongst this group, but it was not possible
to examine this in this report, as data on which lone parents received IWC was not
yet available.
The fact that the positive response to the LPPs is concentrated amongst those lone
parents who had a history of participation in NDLP suggests – but by no means
proves – that the small impact of the pilots might be due to a lack of knowledge of
IWC amongst those lone parents who have not yet decided to look for work;
separately-commissioned qualitative research on both the pilots and ND+fLP should
be informative about this.
Both participation in IWC and the impact of the LPPs increased over time, and so
equivalent impact estimates in future reports may well be higher than those
presented here. On the other hand, the impact of IWC on individual lone parents
might be expected to fall after the 12 month time-limit for payments has been
reached. Given that few of the lone parents who have ever received IWC will have
received it long enough to reach that time-limit in the period covered by the data
used in this report, it is also possible that the estimates of the impact of the pilots
assessed over longer periods in subsequent reports could be lower than those
provided here when assessed over 12 to 24 months. It is therefore unclear, a priori,
whether future impact estimates will be higher or lower than those found in this
report.
Chapter 2 and Appendix F explain how, in theory, the impact of the LPPs in different
districts can be compared to provide estimates of the additional impacts of various
components of the LPPs (for example, this could provide an estimate of the
additional impact of Work Search Premium (WSP) or of Extended Schools Childcare
(ESC) compared with IWC alone). However, this report did not provide such
estimates, other than comparing ND+fLP districts with other districts. This is because
such estimates rely on comparing the estimated impacts in different districts with
each other; because the estimated impact across all districts was so low and not
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always statistically significant, differences between sub-groups were even less likely
to be statistically significant from zero. The authors considered, therefore, having
seen the estimates for all districts, that it would not be meaningful to attempt to
estimate separately the impact of different combinations of policies. It will, though,
be possible to re-examine this issue in future reports; the fact that future reports will
have access to more data means that it is very likely that the estimates of the impact
of the pilots will be estimated more accurately. The estimates in this report, then, are
of the average impact of the LPPs across all districts, although it is likely that any
impacts are dominated by the impact of IWC.
6.4 Future reports
Two further reports are planned as part of this evaluation. These will have access to
individual-level data detailing who actually received IWC, and so will enable greater
focus on whether the LPPs have affected job retention rates, as well as moves off
benefits and into work. They will also have access to more outcome data, such that
they will be able to consider the medium- to long-run impacts of the LPPs on lone
parents in Phases 1 to 3, and the shorter-run impacts on lone parents living in the
Phase 4 pilot districts.
However, it will not simply be a case of repeating the same analysis (outlined in this
report) on later outcomes: the use of a DiD estimator (necessitated by the presence
of unobserved differences between pilot and comparison areas in this report) may
need to be reconsidered. This is because the WPLS only contains benefit and work
outcomes from mid-1999, such that the hypothetical pilots (see Section 3.3 for
more details) will be constrained to start no earlier than 1 January 2002. This means
that for the Phase 1 districts, impact estimates can only be assessed up to 28 months
after the date on which individuals first became eligible for the LPPs in a DiD
framework (up to 34 months for Phase 2 districts and up to 40 months for Phase 3
districts). This issue will need to be addressed in future reports, either by seeking out
alternative methodologies, or by controlling for fewer months of labour market
histories. A technical report will, therefore, examine an alternative methodology for
providing the impact estimates.
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Appendix A
Adjustments made to the
Income Support History file
before constructing a sample
of lone parents potentially
eligible to the lone parent
pilots
To construct the sample for the empirical work requires knowing whether an
individual was eligible for inclusion in the pilot or comparison groups on a given day.
The IS History file can be used for this, because it is supposed to be constructed so
that each line gives the dates within which a certain set of personal characteristics is
applicable.
However, it was not always the case that each line represented a change in one or
more of these personal characteristics: 116,304 lines (approximately one per cent of
the total) were exact duplicates24 of other lines in the dataset, and so were dropped
from the analysis.
It was also the case that for some consecutive lines in the data-set – a situation which
should occur only if there had been a change in the claimant’s circumstances – none
of the relevant variables were different from those in the line above. In such cases, if
all ‘effective from’ (pefffmdt) and ‘effective to’ (pefftodt) dates were consecutive
24 Exact duplicates in terms of the following variables: ccnino, pclmstdt, pefffmdt,
pefftodt, pdob, psex, pcd, pptrflg, pnumchld, pdobchld, pbranoff, bdisdat,
bdispre and cincapfg.
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within a given claim, information was amalgamated by recording the earliest start
date and latest end date on a single line, and dropping the remainder (see example
below).
Table A.1 Adjustments to the Income Support History File; 1
pclmstdt pefffmdt pefftodt pcd pptrflg pnumchld pdobchld pbranoff
14-02-01 14-02-01 23-03-01 W142ND N 0 8435
14-02-01 24-03-01 06-04-01 W142ND N 0 7995
14-02-01 07-04-01 15-06-01 W3 4FZ N 0 7995
14-02-01 16-06-01 03-05-02 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 04-05-02 12-06-03 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 13-06-03 10-07-03 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 11-07-03 02-10-03 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 03-10-03 30-10-03 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 31-10-03 18-03-04 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 19-03-04 21-08-491 W4 8RG N 1 16-June-01 7995
1 Note that the end dates of all continuous Income Support (IS) claims have been recoded to
21 August 2049 for data storage reasons.
Becomes:
Table A.2 Adjustments to the Income Support History File; 2
pclmstdt pefffmdt pefftodt pcd pptrflg pnumchld pdobchld pbranoff
14-02-01 14-02-01 23-03-01 W142ND N 0 8435
14-02-01 24-03-01 06-04-01 W142ND N 0 7995
14-02-01 07-04-01 15-06-01 W3 4FZ N 0 7995
14-02-01 16-06-01 18-03-04 W3 4FZ N 1 16-June-01 7995
14-02-01 19-03-04 21-08-49 W4 8RG N 1 16-June-01 7995
In many cases, however, the dates were not entirely consecutive:
Table A.3 Adjustments to the Income Support History File; 3
pclmstdt pefffmdt pefftodt pcd pptrflg pnumchld pdobchld pbranoff
15-05-99 15-05-99 02-07-99 AB3 9JK N 2 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 15-05-99 10-09-99 AB3 9JK N 2 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 03-07-99 30-07-99 AB3 9JK N 2 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 31-07-99 23-03-01 AB3 9JK N 1 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 11-09-99 23-03-01 AB3 9JK N 1 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 24-03-01 03-05-02 AB3 9JK N 1 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 04-05-02 28-06-02 AB3 9JK N 1 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 29-06-02 22-07-04 AB3 9JK N 1 18-09-86 5214
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In this example, there is inconsistency over the date on which an individual’s
circumstances changed – either 31 July 1999 or 11 September 1999. In such
situations, the rule used was to take the earlier end date as being correct, as long as
this earlier end date was consecutive with the start date on a later line (as is the case
in this example). If this was not the case, then the start date of the second spell was
used: the end dates of 5,196 lines (0.04 per cent) were changed as a result of this
rule.
The above example becomes:
Table A.4 Adjustments to the Income Support History File; 4
pclmstdt pefffmdt pefftodt pcd pptrflg pnumchld pdobchld pbranoff
15-05-99 15-05-99 30-07-99 AB3 9JK N 2 18-09-86 5214
15-05-99 31-07-99 22-07-04 AB3 9JK N 1 18-09-86 5214
Once these adjustments had been made, a total of 4,968,829 superfluous lines (just
under 39 per cent of the dataset) had been dropped. This left only 93 lines where the
‘effective from’ and preceding ‘effective to’ dates were not consecutive. Further
steps were taken to ensure that these problems were eliminated, with issues that
arose during this process outlined in what follows.
In some cases, the same ‘effective from’ date was given on two different lines.
Occasionally, this was accompanied by the ‘effective to’ date falling before the
‘effective from’ date on one of these lines. Where this occurred, the line of negative
length was deleted (this rule dropped one line from the dataset). In other cases, one
of the ‘effective to’ dates tied up with the next ‘effective from’ date, while the other
did not. Where this occurred, the spell with consecutive ‘effective to’ date was kept
and the other spell deleted. In the example below, this rule would drop the second
line (which makes sense, given that this particular line records a child born on
3 August 2004 as being part of a change in the claimant’s circumstances on 28 April
2004). A total of 21 lines were dropped as a result of this rule.
Table A.5 Adjustments to the Income Support History File; 5
pclmstdt pefffmdt pefftodt pcd pptrflg pnumchld pdobchld pbranoff
28-04-04 28-04-04 24-06-04  E16 3NP N 0 4125
28-04-04 28-04-04 26-05-04  E16 3NP N 1 03-08-04 6980
28-04-04 25-06-04 19-08-04  E16 3NP N 0 6980
28-04-04 20-08-04 28-10-04  E16 3NP N 1 03-08-04 6980
28-04-04 27-05-05 21-08-49  E16 3NP N 1 03-08-04 5630
Where two or more of the same ‘effective from’ dates remained, the corresponding
‘effective to’ dates were necessarily non-consecutive with the proceeding ‘effective
from’ date (because of the application of the above rules). In such cases, the latest
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‘effective to’ date was chosen, to maximise the time period over which the data
provided a record of the individual’s personal characteristics, and therefore to
increase their chances of appearing in the sample. This rule deleted a total of 23
lines.
This left 27 non-consecutive lines, 16 of which had the previous ‘effective to’ date
more than one day before the next ‘effective from’ date (i.e. there was a period of
time for which there was no information in the IS History file).
The other 11 non-consecutive lines all have ‘effective to’ dates that are later than the
following ‘effective from’ date. In such cases, ‘effective to’ date was replaced with
the day before the next ‘effective from’ date, under the assumption that the more
recent information is more likely to be correct. The resulting dataset was used to
select the samples, as described in Chapter 4.
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Appendix B
Constructing a sample of lone
parents potentially eligible to
the lone parent pilots from the
Income Support History file
In practice, to be eligible for the lone parent pilots (LPPs), an individual needs to fulfil
all of the following criteria at a given point in time:
• to live in a pilot district;
• to have been claiming Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or
some combination25 for at least 12 months;
• to be a lone parent;
• to stop claiming IS/JSA and to move into work of at least 16 hours a week.
Therefore, the criteria used to construct a sample of benefit claims potentially
affected by the LPPs was that an individual had, at some point in the inflow window
(1 April 2004 to 30 September 2005), to fulfil all of the following criteria:
25 In practice, individuals who have claimed JSA followed by IS for periods of 12
months or more combined were considered; individuals who have claimed IS for
a period of less than 12 months and then moved onto JSA, and individuals who
have only claimed JSA for a period of 12 months or more, are not considered.
However, the number of lone parents who move from IS to JSA, or who only
claim JSA is likely to be relatively small, and as such, this exclusion should not
have any noticeable impact on the estimates of the impact of the lone parent
pilots.
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• live in a pilot district; 26
• have made a claim for IS or JSA (or some combination) whose length exceeds
12 months;
• be a lone parent.
Having identified this set of claims, the first date in the inflow window on which an
individual became eligible for IWC was recorded. Note that in this report, no
consideration has been made for how long individuals remained potentially affected
by the policies. For example, an individual would stop being potentially affected by
the policies if they gained a partner, stopped being responsible for dependent
children, moved out of the pilot districts, or stopped claiming IS/JSA for any reason
other than to move into work of 16 hours or more per week. This means that the
pilot group is defined as those individuals who had a claim for IS/JSA that was
potentially affected by the policies for at least a day.
In constructing the comparison group, the set of individuals were identified who
had, at some point in the inflow window, fulfilled all of the following criteria:
• live in a comparison district;
• have made a claim for IS or JSA (or some combination) whose length exceeds
12 months;
• be a lone parent.
The information in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) and the
National Benefits Database (NBD) is insufficient to construct this sample. The NBD
records whether an IS claim was made by a lone parent only at the start and end of
the claim, but not at any point in between.27 This means that it is not possible to use
NBD data extracted in (say) June 2005 to be able to identify exactly a set of claims of
IS made by lone parents in (say) April 2004 (instead, one can use the NBD to identify
a set of claims which were originally made by lone parents, or a set of ‘live’ claims
currently being received by lone parents).28
26 The tests for unobserved differences were implemented on a similar sample of
pilot and comparison group individuals who became eligible for a hypothetical
policy between 1 April 2002 and 30 September 2003.
27 For ongoing claims at the date of extract, the information in the NBD is the
‘current’ state.
28 The same point also applies to postcode in the NBD (and, therefore, all variables
derived from it): postcode is only recorded at the start and end of a claim, so it is
not possible to use NBD data extracted in (say) June 2005 to identify exactly a set
of claims of IS live on (say) 1 April 2004: instead, one could construct a sample of
claims originally made by individuals living in the pilot districts, or a sample of
live claims received by individuals currently living in the pilot districts.
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For this reason, the IS History file was used to construct a set of claims potentially
affected by the LPPs. Appendix A describes some changes that had to be made to
that file to ensure consistency of the date fields.
Constructing the sample for the empirical work relies upon identifying individuals
who met all of the above criteria at a particular point in time. The variables pptrflg
(indicating whether an individual has a partner or not) and pnumchld (indicating
how many children an individual has) are sufficient to identify whether someone is a
lone parent or not.
To identify whether an individual lived in one of the pilot districts, various mappings
from postcode to higher-level geographical areas were used (in particular, the
mapping was from postcode to LA to Jobcentre Plus district).
Before implementing this mapping, however, it was important to ensure that as
many missing, incomplete or incorrect postcodes were removed from the IS History
file as possible, to maximise the number of individuals in the sample. To do this,
information was imputed from elsewhere in an individual’s IS claim, but only where
this would not compromise the integrity of the IS History file (where personal
characteristics, including postcode, may change from line to line). This was
accomplished according to the following procedure:
• There were 42,937 postcodes that did not exist according to the published Office
for National Statistics (ONS) mapping from postcode to higher geographic areas,
and 114,256 missing postcodes. Some of these missing and incorrect postcodes
were able to be replaced by imputing information from the neighbouring lines
of a particular spell, but only if it was certain that a change in postcode was not
the reason for a new line being generated in the IS History file. This was
accomplished by ensuring that there could have been a change in personal
circumstances for a reason other than a change in postcode, i.e. one of the
following variables had to change between the two lines: pnumchld, pdobchld,
bdisdat, bdispre, cincapfg or pptrflg. By following this procedure, 6,795 previously
missing postcodes and 1,146 incorrect postcodes were imputed.
After all these changes had been made, however, 746,369 spells (6.3 per cent of the
total) were lost.
As stated earlier, to be eligible for the LPPs, an individual also needs to have been
claiming IS (or JSA and IS continuously) for at least 12 months. Using the IS History
file alone to select the sample for the empirical work would therefore miss any
individuals who had, for example, been claiming JSA for six months and then moved
onto IS (and been claiming IS for a period of less than 12 months). All JSA spells from
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the WPLS for individuals in the IS history file were therefore appended to the IS
History file.29
The information about JSA claims is only available from the WPLS, and this restricts
information to what is known at the start and end of an individual’s claim (and not,
for example, at the point at which their claim duration hits 12 months, as for
individuals in the IS History file). Lone parents who had been claiming JSA for a
period of 12 months or more in the sample (either with or without a consecutive IS
spell) were therefore omitted from the sample, as it is not known for certain whether
they were a lone parent, or that they lived in a pilot district, at the point at which their
claim hit 12 months. However, individuals who had initially claimed JSA (but for less
than 12 months) and then moved onto IS, without a break in benefit receipt (and, of
course, on individuals who had been claiming IS alone for a period of 12 months or
more) were included in the sample for the empirical work.
Armed with this information, it is then possible to calculate the first date (in the
inflow window) on which each individual became potentially eligible for IWC:30
• If an individual’s claim hit 12 months prior to the start of the inflow window,
and they were a lone parent living in one of the pilot districts on the first day of
the LPPs, then ‘date first eligible’ was 1 April 2004: such individuals form the
stock sample.
• If an individual’s claim hit 12 months during the inflow window, and they were
a lone parent living in one of the pilot districts at that time, then ‘date first
eligible’ was the date at which their claim hit 12 months: such individuals form
part of the flow sample.
29 To do this, encrypted National Insurance number (NINO) from the IS History file
was merged with encrypted nino from the WPLS. Some NINOs from the IS history
file could be merged to more than one orcid (individual identifier) in the WPLS.
It is not clear why this should be the case (as NINO should be unique to a particular
individual). There were several cases where more than one encrypted NINO was
matched to a single orcid: this is undesirable for the purposes of this evaluation,
as it would lead to two different IS histories being assigned to a single individual,
which is likely to result in inconsistencies. To avoid this, all encrypted NINOs that
were matched to more than one orcid were dropped, or that were matched to
a single orcid, but where another encrypted NINO had also been matched that
same orcid. As a result of these rules, 685 encrypted NINOs were dropped from
the analysis.
30 ‘Date first eligible’ was determined for the comparison group in the same way,
except that, of course, they need to be living in one of the potential comparison
districts (rather than in one of the pilot districts). Note that it is theoretically
possible for an individual to be included in both the pilot and comparison groups
if, for example, a lone parent moved from a comparison district into a pilot
district (or vice versa) during the inflow window. In such cases, individuals were
included in the pilot group only.
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• If an individual’s claim hit 12 months either before or during the inflow window,
but they only became a lone parent living in one of the three early districts at
some later date in the inflow window, then ‘date first eligible’ was this later
date: such individuals form part of the flow sample.
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Appendix C
Adjustments to the Work and
Pensions Longitudinal Study
made before constructing
benefit and work histories and
outcome measures
The Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) combines employment (or, more
accurately, income tax) records from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
with a range of programme and benefit spells from the Department for Work and
Pensions (DWP).
Knowledge about the HMRC records in the WPLS is growing all the time, and at the
time this project was carried out, it was not clear what is ‘best practice’ when
working with this dataset: the rules implemented for this project are, therefore,
described in Sections C.1 to C.4.
C.1 Dropping spells
Upon receipt of the employment (Income Tax) records from HMRC, DWP performs
a number of ‘data-cleaning’ exercises to ensure that the information provided by the
WPLS is as accurate as possible. Based on recommendations from DWP and the
authors’ own analysis, the following spells were dropped:
• Benefit and work spells that ended before 1 June 1999 or start after 1 April
2006.
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• Work spells that have negative, zero or one-day length, and benefit spells that
have negative or zero length.31
• Work spells flagged by the variable ‘benflag’ (see Appendix C).
• Work spells that have been poorly matched to an individual’s benefit records
(i.e. those with match = AmbRe or RedAm).
• Work spells marked as ‘OLD’: this indicates that the record has been updated
and, as such, will appear elsewhere in the WPLS.
• Work spells where the start or end dates were genuinely missing (this does NOT
mean spells where the start date has been set to 6 April, or the end date has
been set to 5 April or 31 December 9999, discussed in Section C.3).
• Benefit spells that represent time spent on programmes rather than benefits.32
C.2 Deleting employment spells that are really taxable
benefit spells
The variable ‘benflag’ was created by DWP to identify employment spells that they
believe are not really employment spells. This may arise because HMRC records
relate to periods in which Income Tax has been paid (and not necessarily periods in
which an individual has been employed), which means it is entirely possible that
some of the ‘employment’ spells in the WPLS are actually periods in which Income
Tax has been paid on the receipt of certain taxable benefits. The variable ‘benflag’
identifies employment spells that:
• are definitely Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Incapacity Benefit (IB) spells (because
they have a payroll code, provided by HMRC, which is specific to the receipt of
that benefit);
• DWP believe are JSA spells (because, for that individual, there is a JSA spell with
identical start and end dates to the employment spell).
Given the large proportion of employment spells in the WPLS with uncertain start or
end dates, however, this reliance on JSA start and end dates tying up exactly with
31 WPLS documentation suggests that most spells that start and finish on the same
day are erroneous (the authors understand that they have been incorrectly input
by HMRC personnel); most spells that end before they start are for New Deal for
Lone Parents (NDLP). DWP advise that one-day employment spells occur when
HMRC have been told about the end date of a job, but have no idea when the
job started: these spells were removed and an indicator for having a one-day
work spell was included in most of the multi-variate regressions in the empirical
analysis.
32 Defined as prgmtype == 4 | prgmtype == 13 | prgmtype == 16 | (prgmtype >
100 & prgmtype < .).
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employment start and end dates is likely to miss a considerable number of
employment spells that are actually taxable benefit spells. Moreover, JSA is not the
only programme/benefit that could appear as an employment spell33 (and, indeed,
the problem of identical start and end dates is exacerbated in the case of non-JSA
spells, where benefit end dates are randomised between the dates on which records
are extracted).
There are a number of situations in which the authors consider that it is more likely
that a given employment spell records time on benefit rather than in work:
Case 1:
• employment and non-JSA benefit start dates are the same;
• employment and non-JSA benefit end dates are known and within X days of
one another (where X = number of days between extracts).34
e.g. benefit spell: 7 August 2003 to 14 January 2004
employment spell: 7 August 2003 to 9 January 2004
532 (0.01 per cent) employment spells were deleted as a result of this rule.
Case 2:
• employment and benefit start dates are the same;
• employment end date is uncertain (set to 5 April);
• benefit end date is the same as (or before) the employment end date, and in the
same tax year as the employment end date.
e.g. benefit spell: 1 June 2001 to 1 September 2001
employment spell: 1 June 2001 to 5 April 2002
45,829 (0.76 per cent) employment spells were deleted as a result of this rule.
Case 3:
• employment and benefit start dates are the same;
• employment end date is continuous (set to 31 December 9999);
• benefit end date is the same as (or before) the employment end date.
e.g. benefit spell: 9 April 2004 to 10 April 2005
employment spell: 9 April 2004 to 31 December 9999
6,264 (0.10 per cent) employment spells were deleted as a result of this rule.
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33 Income Support (IS), IB, JSA and Widow’s Benefit (WB) were used to identify
taxable benefit spells.
34 Note: this rule was only applied to IS and IB spells.
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C.3 Duplicate and uncertain work spells
The work spells in the WPLS suffer from two major problems:
• Duplicate records describing the same spell in work (or near-duplicate records
that appear to describe the same spell in work but contain different information
about start and end dates).
• Uncertain start and end dates: where HMRC know in which tax year a job started
or finished, but not the precise date, they use 6 April to indicate start and 5 April
to indicate end dates.
As only 53 per cent of all employment spells in the WPLS sample had only certain
start and end dates (the others were either ongoing, or had an uncertain start or end
date), the rules used to reduce the uncertainty surrounding employment spells may
be important to the analysis.
To deal with duplicate (or near-duplicate) records, records of work spells that were
exact duplicates (in terms of start and end date) were dropped. Where this still left
multiple work spells with the same start date, all were dropped except the most
recently added spell that contained a certain end date.35 If none of the spells with the
same start date had a certain end date, then all were dropped except the spell that
indicated that the job was ongoing (if it existed). If all of the spells with the same start
date had end dates of 5 April, then no spells were dropped nothing.
To deal with the uncertain start and end dates, the following rules were implemented:
Correcting uncertain employment end dates using known benefit start
dates
• employment end date is uncertain (i.e. set to 5 April);
• benefit start date is after the employment start date, and in the same tax year as
the uncertain employment end date.
e.g. benefit spell: 5 August 2004 to 18 September 2005
employment spell: 17 March 2004 to 6 April 2005
Here, the employment end date would be changed to 4 August 2004.
Note: This rule was applied to New Deal programmes, IB, Severe Disablement
Allowance (SDA), IS and JSA spells only.
290,390 (4.88 per cent) employment spells were corrected as a result of this
rule.
35 A ‘certain end date’ is one that is not 5 April or 31 December 9999.
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Correcting uncertain employment start dates using known benefit end
dates
• employment start date is uncertain (i.e. set to 6th April);
• benefit end date is before the employment end date, and in the same tax year as
the uncertain employment start date
e.g. benefit spell: 14 June 2003 to 29 November 2003
employment spell: 6 April 2003 to 22 March 2004
Here, the employment start date would be changed to 30 Nov 2003.
Note: This rule was applied to ND programmes, IB, SDA, IS and JSA spells only.
289,319 (4.86 per cent) employment spells were corrected as a result of this
rule.
C.4 Uncertain benefit spells
The end date of non-JSA benefit claims is also not known with certainty: the NBD
and WPLS record the date of the last extract at which a claim was live (extract), and
the date before the first extract where a claim did not appear (cdmaxclm).36 All that
is known is that the claim ended at some point between those two dates.
36 Usually, the gap between cdmaxclm and extract is 13 days for IS spells (because
extracts are fortnightly), but the gap can be considerably longer.
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Appendix D
Constructing outcome and
history variables from the
Work and Pensions
Longitudinal Study
D.1 Definition of the outcome and history variables
Having cleaned the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), a number of
interim datasets were created, recording periods where the individual was in work,
periods where the individual was on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), periods where the
individual was on New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP), periods where the individual
was receiving a disability benefit, periods where the individual was receiving any
benefit.
It is then straightforward to use these datasets to create the history and outcome
variables. The outcome variables were defined as whether an individual is on
benefit/in work X days after they first become eligible for the policies, where X is
defined here as 91, 182, 273, 364, 455, 546, 637 & 728 days (corresponding
approximately to three-monthly intervals).
Variables were created to describe individuals’ benefit-claiming (and work) history
during the period 12-30 months (0-30 months for work history) before the
individual first became eligible for the lone parent pilots (LPP) (by definition, all lone
parents were on benefit in the 12 months before first becoming potentially eligible
to the LPPs). This method was used in Dolton et al. (2006), although the periods are
longer in this analysis (three or five months, rather than 11 weeks).
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The variables were constructed in the following way:
• The relevant period was split into six equal-sized periods (three month periods
for benefit history and five month periods for the work histories).
• Six indicator variables were calculated indicating whether the person was mainly
in work or mainly on benefit during each of the six periods in the period described
above.
• Both sets of six variables were independently combined to give two categorical
variables, taking values 1 to 64 depending on the ordering of the history over
these six periods. For example, an individual who was on benefit in all six quarters
might be given value 1, an individual who was on benefit for all but the last of
these quarters might be given value 2, and so on.
• These categorical variables were then used to generate 128 indicator variables
corresponding to each of the possible work and benefit histories during the six
quarters of interest.
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Appendix E
Local-area data
This appendix describes the data sources that were used to provide relevant
information about the local areas in which lone parents live. All of these data sources
could be mapped to the sample of lone parents from the IS History file based on the
lone parent’s postcode.
E.1 Childcare data
The childcare data derives from Office for Standards in Education’s (Ofsted’s)
records of the number of registered childcare places (all providers have to register if
they wish to look after children under eight). This may directly affect the labour
supply of individuals in the sample, as lone parents (particularly those with young
children) may need access to childcare to enable them to work. Also, higher supply
of childcare in an area may indicate higher demand for it, which may, in turn, be
indicative of a strong local labour market.
Data from 2003/04 was obtained on the number of crèche places, full day care
places, sessional day care places, multiple day-care places, out of school care places
and places with childminders in each output area. The data was weighted to give an
indication of how many childcare places of each type are available to each child,
bearing in mind that children may go to childcare providers in different output areas
(but usually within the same super output area, or ward). The estimate of the
number of childcare places of each type was defined as the number in the output
area itself plus the number in the super output area divided by the number of output
areas in the super output area plus the number in the ward divided by the number of
output areas in the ward.
E.2 Census data
A number of variables from the 2001 census (provided by the Office for National
Statistics (ONS)) were used. Data is available on a variety of topics, including most
recent occupation, employment status, housing tenure and ethnicity, to name but a
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few, with tables providing both the number of people in each category and the total
number of people in the relevant geographic area.37
In addition to the standard census tables, a specific request to ONS was made to
obtain data on the proportion of workless lone parents with various qualification
levels at the middle-layer super output area level (this is a larger area than the lower-
layer super output area level used for other census data and the Index of Multiple
Deprivation (IMD) data, described in Section E.3).
E.3 Index of Multiple Deprivation
Data from the 2004 IMD (which contains data from 2002) was used at the lower-
layer super output area (SOA) level. There are six separate measures of deprivation,
relating to employment, housing, crime, environment, education and income,
which are also combined to produce an overall measure. In the empirical work,
indicators were included for which quintile of the distribution each SOA belongs to.
E.4 NOMIS travel to work area level data
In order to control for differences in the state of the local labour market between
areas, data from NOMIS on claimant count unemployment rates and job density
ratios for different travel to work areas was used. Travel to work areas are a good
estimate of the size of the local labour market as they are areas where 75 per cent of
workers living in the area work and 75 per cent of those working in the area live. Job
density ratios, defined as the number of jobs in an area divided by the number of
people of working age living in the area are both a measure of the proportion activity
rate among those living in the area and of the strength of the demand for labour in
the area. Annual average claimant count unemployment rates and job density ratios
were used from 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.
37 Note that to preserve the confidentiality of personal information, there is a degree
of randomisation in the totals, in so much as there are never one or two lone
parents in an district in a particular category, only zero or three. This means that
the total number of lone parents in each district will not be the same in each
table.
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Appendix F
Explanatory (or matching)
variables used in multivariate
analysis
This appendix lists the variables included in the test for unobserved differences
(Appendix J), and in the main difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the impact
(Chapter 6). More detail of how some of these variables were constructed can be
found in Chapter 4, or in Appendices D and E. For ordinary least squares (OLS) and
fully-interacted linear matching (FILM) estimates, these are the variables in the
regression (along with the indicator for being in a pilot district); for propensity score
matching (PSM) estimates, these are the variables used in the first-stage probit that
generates the propensity scores.
In many cases, an additional indicator was included to flag missing values.
1. Smaller set of explanatory variables
Individual-level variables:
Indicator for claimants’ sex.
Indicators for claimants’ age (banded) at date first potentially eligible.
Number of children at date first potentially eligible.
Age of youngest child at date first potentially eligible.
Amount of Income Support (IS) at start of IS claim.
Whether claimant has been on New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) in the 30 months
before date first potentially eligible.
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Whether claimant has been on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in the 30 months before
date first potentially eligible.
Whether claimant has been on a disability benefit in the 30 months before date first
potentially eligible.
Whether claimant received a disability premium to IS at start of IS claim.
Proportion of past 30 months claimant has been on benefits.
Proportion of past 30 months claimant has been in work.
Indicators for detailed work and benefit histories over the past 30 months (see
Appendix D for details).
Whether claimant has had a one day work spell in the past 30 months38.
Indicators for the month in which the claimant first became potentially eligible (flow
samples only).
Area-level variables (geographic area in brackets denotes the scale at which this is
measured where this is not obvious).
Indicator for Jobcentre Plus district.
Proportion of Jobcentre Plus district with integrated offices at date first potentially
eligible.
Number of day care, other centre-based care and childminder places per child aged
under 8 in local area (weighted average of OA, SOA and ward).
Indicators for quintile of distribution of overall IMD score (SOA).
Unemployment rate in 2002/03 and 2003/04 (TTWA).
Fraction of lone parents in SOA who owned their own property in 2001 Census.
Fraction of lone parents in SOA in work in 2001 Census.
Fraction of non-working lone parents in SOA with level 4 or higher qualifications in
2001 Census.
Fraction of non-working lone parents in SOA with level 3 qualifications in 2001
Census.
38 One day work spells occur when Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is
notified that a job has ended, but they have no idea when the job started (i.e.
they do not even know in which tax year it started): the start date for the spell is
then set to the day before the (known) end-date.
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Fraction of non-working lone parents in SOA with level 2 qualifications in 2001
Census.
Fraction of non-working lone parents in SOA with level 1 qualifications in 2001
Census.
Fraction of non-working lone parents in SOA with unknown qualifications in 2001
Census
2. Larger set of explanatory variables (these were used only in the





Fraction of population in SOA with good health in 2001 Census.
Fraction of households in SOA that are lone parents in 2001 Census.
Occupational breakdown of lone parents in SOA in 2001 Census (7 categories + 1
omitted).
Fraction of lone parent households that do not have a car in SOA in 2001 Census.
Fraction of parents of dependent children who worked full-time in SOA in 2001
Census.
Fraction of parents of dependent children who worked part-time in SOA in 2001
Census.
Fraction of parents of dependent children who were unemployed (ILO definition) in
SOA in 2001 Census.
Fraction of lone parents who worked full-time in SOA in 2001 Census.
Fraction of lone parents who were unemployed in SOA in 2001 Census.
Ethnic breakdown of individuals in SOA (four categories and one omitted).
Fraction of lone parent households who owned their house in SOA in 2001 Census.
Fraction of lone parent households who were renting from a private-sector landlord
in SOA in 2001 Census.
More detail on the number of childcare places available (six categories).
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Table F.1 Variables used in multi-variate analysis
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Comparison pilot pilot pilot
Variable districts districts districts districts
Variables from the WPLS
Proportion of months 30 to 12 before
eligibility spent on benefits 22.3% 22.0% 17.4% 13.1%
Proportion of months 30 to 12 before
eligibility spent in work 17.2% 15.3% 14.8% 13.2%
Number of children on date first eligible 1.82 1.88 1.86 1.93
Age of youngest child on date first eligible 6.5 6.4 6.7 6.8
Proportion disabled on date first eligible 0.35% 0.22% 0.49% 0.16%
Amount of Income Support at start of claim £76.35 £81.25 £78.60 £81.42
Proportion disabled at any time 22.1% 17.0% 20.4% 16.3%
Proportion on JSA 9.9% 10.0% 8.7% 7.0%
Proportion who have been on NDLP 18.9% 15.6% 16.2% 14.9%
Census variables
Proportion of lone parents who are
owner occupiers 24.2% 25.1% 21.5% 20.1%
Proportion of lone parents renting from
council 40.5% 39.9% 44.4% 42.3%
Proportion of lone parents in other social
rented accommodation 15.7% 18.7% 18.8% 25.8%
Proportion of lone parents in privately
rented accommodation 19.7% 16.8% 15.9% 11.9%
Proportion of lone parents living in
overcrowded accommodation 11.1% 25.5% 22.1% 32.2%
Proportion of parents working part-time 20.7% 16.3% 18.4% 16.0%
Proportion of parents working full-time 38.2% 40.3% 39.6% 40.4%
Unemployment rate among parents 5.8% 6.1% 5.9% 6.5%
Inactivity rate among parents 35.3% 37.0% 36.1% 37.1%
Proportion of lone parents working
part-time 22.9% 15.4% 19.5% 14.6%
Proportion of lone parents working
full-time 18.2% 23.3% 21.0% 25.4%
Lone parent unemployment rate 6.8% 7.2% 6.8% 7.3%
Lone parent inactivity rate 52.1% 54.1% 52.8% 51.4%
Proportion of lone parents working in
higher managerial positions 1.8% 3.0% 2.4% 3.2%
Proportion of lone parents working in
lower managerial positions 10.7% 14.9% 12.1% 15.2%
Proportion of lone parents in intermediate
occupations 8.7% 10.7% 9.8% 11.8%
Proportion of lone parents who are small
employers or own account workers 2.6% 2.5% 2.7% 2.5%
Continued
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Table F.1 Continued
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Comparison pilot pilot pilot
Variable districts districts districts districts
Proportion of lone parents in lower
supervisory positions 4.9% 3.6% 4.7% 3.6%
Proportion of lone parents in semi-routine
work 21.2% 15.0% 18.7% 14.9%
Proportion of lone parents in routine work 14.5% 7.8% 11.7% 6.2%
Proportion of lone parents who have never
worked or are long-term unemployed 15.1% 19.3% 16.1% 19.0%
Proportion of lone parents in an
unclassified occupation 20.5% 23.4% 21.8% 23.0%
Proportion of lone parents without access
to a car 57.6% 54.9% 60.1% 56.3%
Proportion white 90.8% 68.4% 79.7% 59.6%
Proportion mixed race 1.6% 3.6% 2.9% 4.0%
Proportion Asian 4.8% 9.9% 9.2% 13.7%
Proportion black 2.2% 15.6% 6.3% 20.1%
Proportion Chinese 0.6% 2.5% 1.9% 2.6%
Proportion of lone parent households 12.9% 13.3% 12.4% 12.7%
Variables from Special Census Request
Employment rate (msoa level) 65.2% 61.8% 64.6% 61.3%
Proportion of unemployed lone parents
with level 4 or 5 qualifications 5.0% 8.6% 7.7% 9.9%
Proportion of unemployed lone parents
with level 3 qualifications 5.5% 7.9% 7.2% 8.7%
Proportion of unemployed lone parents
with level 2 qualifications 21.1% 22.0% 20.3% 22.2%
Proportion of unemployed lone parents
with level 1 qualifications 20.4% 19.1% 18.8% 18.7%
Proportion of unemployed lone parents
without any qualifications 43.8% 37.9% 41.7% 35.8%
Proportion of unemployed lone parents
with unknown qualification level 4.2% 4.5% 4.3% 4.8%
Childcare variables
Weighted number of places in crèches per
child under eight 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Weighted number of full day care places
per child under eight 0.17 0.12 0.21 0.19
Weighted number of sessional day care
places per child under eight 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
Weighted number of multiple day care
places per child under eight 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05
Weighted number of out of school care
places per child under eight 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.13
Continued
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Table F.1 Continued
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Comparison pilot pilot pilot
Variable districts districts districts districts
Weighted number of childminder places
per child under eight 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12
Weighted number of day care places
per child under eight 0.33 0.24 0.37 0.31
IMD variables
Overall IMD score 39.3 36.0 38.1 34.4
Income deprivation score 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26
Employment deprivation score 0.19 0.15 0.94 0.13
Health deprivation score 0.89 0.44 0.58 0.39
Education deprivation score 42.2 30.5 35.5 22.1
Housing deprivation score 19.0 30.6 24.9 34.8
Crime deprivation score 0.54 0.65 0.62 0.64
Environment deprivation score 29.1 34.1 36.4 34.6
NOMIS TTWA level data
Average claimant count unemployment
rate: 2000 3.4% 3.4% 3.1% 3.2%
2001 3.0% 3.2% 2.9% 3.0%
2002 2.9% 3.3% 2.9% 3.2%
2003 2.8% 3.3% 2.9% 3.2%
Job density ratio: 2000 0.78 0.91 0.87 0.94
2001 0.79 0.91 0.87 0.94
2002 0.80 0.90 0.87 0.92
2003 0.81 0.92 0.88 0.94
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Appendix G
Estimating the impact of the
different policy packages
In reality, lone parents living in the lone parent pilots (LPP) districts will be exposed to
one of a number of combinations of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) policies, depending on: when
they are observed in the data, in which Jobcentre Plus district and/or which Local
Education Authority (LEA) they live, how long they have been on Income Support
(IS)/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), and the age of their youngest child.
The different combinations of policies (‘treatments’) are:
• In Work Credit (IWC) alone;
• IWC and Work Search Premium (WSP);
• IWC and Extended Schools Childcare (ESC) (for lone parents who do not meet
Extended Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interview (ESQWFI) conditions);
• IWC, ESC and ESQWFI (for lone parents who do meet ESQWFI conditions);
• IWC, WSP and ESC (for lone parents who do not meet ESQWFI conditions);
• IWC, WSP, ESC and ESQWFI (for lone parents who do meet ESQWFI conditions).
In addition, those lone parents in ND+fLP districts will experience a slightly different
set of services from their personal advisers.39
39 Given that ESC pilots are being implemented differently in each LEA, it is possible
to view them as different policies: this increases the number of treatments even
further, because there are seven ESC districts in England and three outside.
However, it is simpler to think of ESCs as a single treatment of ‘providing money
to LEAs to improve childcare provision in the best way they can’, and estimate
the average effect of ESCs across the seven (or ten) areas.
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The fact that different districts are operating different policies (or different
combinations of policies) is extremely easy to take into account in a linear regression
framework. Propensity score matching (PSM) can also be extended to incorporate
these different packages: using normal matching techniques, a series of
counterfactuals can be constructed, each corresponding to the outcome that would
have arisen had a particular lone parent been subject to any of the policies (or
combinations of policies) on offer.
By taking differences of these estimates, it is in principle possible to calculate the net
impact of some of the policies. Table G.1 explains this point in more detail.
Table G.1 ‘Pilot’ and ‘comparison’ districts for different
combinations of policies
Treatment Pilot districts Comparison districts
Impact of IWC alone C London, Staffordshire, All districts unaffected by
(compared to nothing) everywhere else in London the lone parent pilots
(not NE London), new S-E districts
Combined impact of IWC W London, Cardiff and Vale, All districts unaffected by
and WSP (compared to Edinburgh etc, Lancashire West, the lone parent pilots
nothing) Dudley and Sandwell (not Sandwell)
compared to all comparison districts
Additional impact of WSP W London, Cardiff and Vale, C London, Staffordshire,
conditional on IWC being Edinburgh etc, Lancashire West, everywhere else in
present Dudley and Sandwell (not Sandwell) London (not NE London)
Combined impact of Bradford, Leicestershire, SE London All districts unaffected by
ESQWFI, ESC, IWC and (Greenwich. Lewisham), Dudley and the lone parent pilots
WSP (compared to Sandwell (Sandwell) compared to all
nothing) comparison districts
Combined impact of Haringey All districts unaffected by
ESQWFI, ESC and IWC the lone parent pilots
(compared to nothing)
Additional impact of ESC Bradford, Leicestershire, SE London W London, Cardiff and Vale,
and ESQWFI conditional (Greenwich, Lewisham), Dudley and Edinburgh etc, Lancashire
on conditional on IWC and Sandwell (Sandwell) West, Dudley and
WSP being present Sandwell (not Sandwell)
Combined impact of ESC Grampian & Tayside (part), All districts unaffected by
and ESQWFI (compared to Forth Valley & Fife, SE Wales the lone parent pilots
nothing) (part)
Table G.1 shows how the combined impact of ESCs and ESQWFIs on lone parents
whose youngest child is at least 12 years old can be estimated. It is hard to separate
the impact of these two policies because they are being piloted in the same districts,
but there are two strategies:
a) Compare the outcomes of lone parents eligible for ESQWFIs to (otherwise-
equivalent) lone parents in the same district whose youngest child is younger
than 12. This would make use of the discontinuity in the design of ESQWFIs.
101Appendices – Estimating the impact of the different policy packages
b) Compare the outcomes of lone parents eligible for ESQWFIs to similar lone
parents in unaffected districts (having controlled for differences in the districts).
These methods both have potential drawbacks: a) identifies the impact of ESQWFI
PLUS the impact of ESC on lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 or above
MINUS the impact of ESC on lone parents whose youngest child is aged under 12: b)
identifies the combined impact of ESQWFI and ESC on lone parents whose youngest
child is over 12; a similar estimator would identify the impact of ESC alone on lone
parents whose youngest child is under 12.
So far, the three LEAs who began ESC pilots in April 2004 have not offered services
to lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 or above. If the impact of ESC on
lone parents whose youngest child is over 12 is zero, then method a) will give an
estimate of the impact of ESQWFI that is biased down, but method b) will give an
unbiased estimate of the impact of ESQWFI.
If, however, other ESC pilots have a non-negative impact on lone parents whose
youngest child is aged over 12, and if they have larger impacts on lone parents
whose youngest child is under 12 than those whose youngest child is over 12, then
the estimates a) and b) above will bound the true value: method a) will give an under-
estimate of the impact of ESQWFIs, and method b) will give an over-estimate of the
impact of ESQWFIs.40
Furthermore, method a) will be of limited use unless ESQWFIs have a large and
relatively immediate effect once a lone parent’s youngest child turns 12. This is
because searching for effects of ESQWFIs (say) 24 months after the youngest child
turns 12 means that the comparison group would need to have children who are
younger than ten, thereby reducing the similarities between the comparison and
pilot group, and weakening the attraction of the regression discontinuity approach.
Given the relatively small and imprecisely estimated impacts presented in this report,
it was decided not to estimate the impact of each of the different packages of
treatments in Table D.1; instead, this report merely distinguishes between those five
districts that operated New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP), and the other
districts offering IWC (possibly with WSP).
40 Both estimates may have large confidence intervals, i.e. may be relatively imprecise.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































105Appendices – Using Ordinary Least Squares, Fully Integrated Linear Matching and Propensity
Score Matching to estimate the impact of the lone parent pilots
Appendix H
Using Ordinary Least Squares,
Fully Integrated Linear
Matching and Propensity
Score Matching to estimate
the impact of the lone parent
pilots
The preferred comparison group (lone parents who have been claiming Income
Support (IS)/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months and who live in
districts that are not affected by the lone parent pilots (LPPs) can be used as a guide
to what would have happened to the lone parents potentially affected by the LPPs
had they lived in other districts: such individuals can be used to calculate a
‘difference’ estimate of the impact of the LPPs.
Such an estimator can be implemented using either linear methods (Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) or Fully Integrated Linear Matching (FILM)41), or Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) techniques. In a linear framework, an estimate comes from a linear
regression of the outcome of interest (for example, whether an individual is in
employment, or whether they are claiming a particular benefit) on a set of area-
based and individual-level control variables, plus an indicator variable for whether
41 FILM is a more flexible version of OLS, in which each of the X variables is interacted
with the treatment variable, thus allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects.
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the individual lived in one of the LPP districts. If the parameter estimate associated
with this indicator variable is significantly different from zero, then it can be said that
the LPPs had a significant effect on the outcome.
To implement PSM, a probit model is run, in which the dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the person has access to the LPPs (i.e. is in the pilot group) and to 0 if they do
not (i.e. is in the chosen comparison group). This allows a prediction of the
probability of being in the pilot group, given the person’s individual and local-area
characteristics (also known as the propensity score). Each member of the pilot group
is then ‘matched’ to either the individual with the closest propensity score, or to a
weighted group of similar individuals (in terms of propensity score) from the chosen
comparison group (Appendix J presents estimates using a variety of different
methods). Another way of viewing this is that each individual in the LPP districts is
compared with otherwise identical individuals (or groups of individuals) living in
comparison districts.
Once this re-weighting process has occurred, the estimate of the (mean) impact of
the LPPs is obtained by comparing the (mean) labour market outcomes of the pilot
group with the (mean) labour market outcomes of the matched (weighted)
comparison group. If these are significantly different, then the LPPs can be said to
have had an impact on labour market outcomes. Estimates derived using PSM will be
valid estimates of the true impact of the LPPs if all outcome-relevant differences
between the pilot and comparison groups have been controlled for (over and above
the absence/presence of the LPPs): the success and reliability of the impact estimates
will therefore depend crucially on the amount and quality of the characteristics that
can be observed in the available data sources (Chapter 4 has more details of the
various data sources used).
The key advantage of PSM over a multivariate linear regression method is that it
helps to ensure that the evaluation is comparing genuinely comparable groups.42
This is because PSM techniques impose what is known as ‘common support’ by
excluding individuals from the pilot group who look very different (in terms of X)
from individuals in the comparison group.43 OLS and FILM, on the other hand, can be
implemented on pilot and comparison groups who look very different: there is no
requirement for common support, and the assumption of linearity becomes very
42 It is possible to test the similarity of estimates produced by OLS/FILM and PSM,
which may be important, as one of the key disadvantages of using PSM is that it
is relatively time-consuming to implement (compared to OLS/FILM).
43 PSM techniques exclude lone parents living in the pilot districts if their propensity
score falls outside the range of propensity scores calculated for lone parents
living in the comparison districts. This means that for these individuals, there are
no lone parents living in the comparison districts who would provide an
appropriate comparison group (the basis on which the PSM method rests), such
that they need to be excluded from the analysis.
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important, as impact estimates are extrapolated outside the range of common
support. Under the special conditions: a) that the imposition of common support
does not cause any individuals to be dropped from the pilot group, and: b) that the
distribution of characteristics between the pilot and comparison groups is identical
(such that the re-weighting process does not have any effect), then the two methods
are virtually identical.
The fact that PSM imposes common support is not always an advantage: individuals
in the pilot districts for whom a good match cannot be found do not contribute to
the PSM estimate of the impact of a policy. Technically, the impact estimated by PSM
is not the average impact of the programme on all those affected by it; it is the
average impact for those on the common support.
Appendices – Using Ordinary Least Squares, Fully Integrated Linear Matching and Propensity






The standard multivariate linear regression used to estimate the impact of the lone
parent pilots using the difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology was specified as
follows:
itjjtijtijt TDTDXy εααχβ ++++′= 21 ,
where yijt measures the outcome of interest (either whether off benefit or whether in
work) for individual i living in district j at time t, Xijt contains some variables at the
individual-level, some at the area-level, and some that vary with time, TDjt is an
indicator for whether district j operated a lone parent pilot (LPP) at time t, Dj was a set
of indicators recording whether district j was a pilot district (i.e. operated an LPP at
some point) and if so which one44, and is an indicator for whether the outcomes are
being measured after the (actual or hypothetical) LPPs had begun (presumed to be
April 2004 in the comparison districts) is, therefore, equal to times Tt.
In such a regression, the coefficient (potentially a vector of coefficients) on the set of
indicators estimate the (average) difference in outcomes between lone parents in a
particular pilot district and the set of all comparison districts before the LPPs began.
The coefficient on estimates the (average) difference in outcomes between the
periods before and after the LPPs began (and this is assumed to be identical in the
pilot and comparison districts). The coefficient on estimates the (average) additional
impact of the LPPs: this is the coefficient (or set of coefficients for the regressions
Appendices – The difference-in-differences estimator – detail
44 For example, when the regression was run on the flow sample, the vector
consisted of 14 indicator variables, one for each pilot district.
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using the flow sample that estimate the impact in each Phase) reported in the
Tables.45
Section 5.4 shows how the impact of the LPPs varied across different types of lone
parents. These estimates were derived from a slightly more complicated regression:
iitijjtiijtijt ZTZDTDZXy ε+α+α+α+χ+β′= 321
where is a set of indicators classifying lone parents (for example, into male and
female lone parents, or into lone parents who had recently, in the past or never been
on New Deal for Lone Parnts (NDLP)). In such a regression, outcomes are allowed to
be different (on average) between the different groups of lone parents in the
absence of the LPPs, and these differences are allowed to be different in the pilot and
comparison districts, but these differences are assumed not to vary over time.
Appendices – The difference-in-differences estimator – detail
45 Some regressions estimated the average impact across all districts, and some





differences between pilot and
comparison districts
This appendix presents the results from analysis designed to test for the presence of
unobserved46 differences between pilot and comparison districts, either in terms of
the characteristics of the districts themselves, or of the characteristics of the lone
parents who live there. This kind of test (hereafter referred to as a ‘test for
unobserved differences’) looks at the similarity between the outcomes of the chosen
comparison group (lone parents on Income Support (IS)/Jobseeker’s Allowance
(JSA) for at least 12 months living in districts not affected by the lone parent pilots
(LPPs)) and those of lone parents living in pilot districts at a time when there were no
pilots in operation.
In practice, a test for unobserved differences implements the same methodology
that is used to estimate the impact of a genuine pilot or programme, but using data
from a time when there was no such programme. This means comparing the
proportion of the two groups off benefit or in work at various points in time after a
hypothetical (non-existent) programme began, having controlled for a range of
individual and local-area characteristics (described in Chapter 4). Specifically, if the
test is implemented using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Fully Interacted Linear
Matching (FILM) and the parameter estimate associated with the indicator variable
for whether an individual lived in a pilot district is significant (even when there is no
Appendices – Testing for unobserved differences between pilot and comparison districts
46 This means unobserved by the researcher, i.e. characteristics that it is not possible
to control for on the basis of the data sources available. Note that only
characteristics that are likely to affect labour market outcomes are important in
this definition of unobserved.
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pilot in operation); or if it is implemented using Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
and the mean labour market outcomes of individuals in the pilot districts are
significantly different to those of re-weighted individuals in the comparison districts,
then unobserved differences between districts may pose a problem.47
Blundell et al. (2001) take a slightly different approach in their evaluation of the New
Deal for Young People (NDYP). They too use individuals in districts not operating the
programme (in this case, NDYP), but to test the validity of this comparison group,
Blundell et al. (2001) estimate the annual impact of a hypothetical programme over
a 16-year period prior to the introduction of NDYP. They view these 16 estimates as
representing the distribution of impacts that one would expect to find in the
absence of any programme, and then show that their estimated impact of NDYP falls
comfortably outside this historical range. Sufficient historical data is not available to
do this.
These tests for unobserved differences are implemented using data from April 2002
to March 2004, and by assuming that a hypothetical programme began on 1 April
2002 in the districts in Phases 1-3 of the LPPs. Table J.1 presents the sample sizes of
interest.
Table J.1 Sample sizes for hypothetical pilots (introduced
1 April 2002)
Comparison
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 districts
Stock 41,951 80,509 74,115 314,575
Flow 17,518 45,485 39,864 144,876
The tables below show the mean outcome in the pilot districts, the raw (unadjusted)
difference between the pilot and comparison districts (these are the differences
implied by Figures M.1 to M.4), and a series of estimates of the treatment effect of
the hypothetical policy. To save space, this appendix reports only outcomes after
364 days.
For OLS and FILM, the estimated treatment effect is the coefficient on an indicator
variable for being in a pilot district. For the PSM estimates, the estimated treatment
effect is the difference in the mean outcomes of individuals living in the pilot districts
and appropriately re-weighted individuals living in the comparison districts. In both
cases, unobserved differences are said to exist if this treatment effect is different
from zero, i.e. there are differences between the pilot and comparison districts (or
the individuals living in these districts) that are not adequately captured by the
control variables available (to the researcher).
47 See Appendix H for more details of how these methods can be implemented.
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For both the stock and flow samples, the Tables show the estimated treatment effect
for each phase, and across all phases. PSM estimates proved sensitive to the local-
area characteristics chosen as matching variables, so the Tables show the results
using both a smaller and a larger set of explanatory variables (see Box J.1; Appendix
F gives the sample means of these and other explanatory variables).
J.1 Flow sample
As shown in the graphs, there are large differences in the unadjusted outcomes
between the pilot and comparison groups: lone parents in the pilot group are
significantly more likely to be claiming benefits and significantly less likely to be
employed than those in the comparison group.
These differences remain after controlling for the small set of explanatory variables:
the estimated coefficients in Tables J.2 and J.3 are generally negative and significant,
indicating the presence of unobserved48 differences between the pilot and comparison
districts.
Tables J.4 and J.5 show that adding more local-area variables to the set of
explanatory/matching variables makes it less likely that unobserved differences are
found: this can be seen from the fact that some of the estimated treatment effects
become statistically insignificant; however, the PSM estimates indicate that there
tends to be a problem with common support49: this means that many individuals in
the pilot districts have been excluded from the analysis, either because similar
individuals could not be found in the comparison districts, or because similar
individuals could be found, but that the pilot and comparison districts in which they
live are too different. Where some of the treatment group has been dropped, the
estimated impact of the LPPs will only apply to the remaining subset of lone parents,
who are likely to differ significantly from those lone parents who have been
excluded from the analysis.
48 This assumes that the additional variables used in the larger set of explanatory/
matching variables have no impact on the labour market outcomes of lone parents
in either the pilot or comparison districts.
49 PSM techniques exclude lone parents living in the pilot districts if their propensity
score (calculated on the basis of the set of characteristics outlined in Box J.1) falls
outside the range of propensity scores calculated for lone parents living in the
comparison districts. This means that for these individuals, there are no lone
parents living in the comparison districts who would provide an appropriate
comparison group (the basis on which the PSM method rests), such that they
need to be excluded from the analysis.
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Furthermore, one of the key diagnostic tests used in PSM shows that the median bias
of the characteristics of the pilot group compared to the comparison group has
actually worsened after matching.50 This is highly undesirable.
J.2 Stock sample
A very similar pattern of results exists for the stock sample. Tables J.6 and J.7 show
that lone parents in the pilot group are significantly more likely to be claiming
benefits and significantly less likely to be employed than those in the comparison
group, and that these differences remain after controlling for the small set of
explanatory variables.
Tables J.8 and J.9 show that the estimated treatment effects are more likely to be
statistically insignificant after adding more local-area variables to the set of
explanatory/matching variables, but that there are still several statistically significant
estimated treatment effects, indicating that there are some unobserved differences
between the pilot and comparison districts. Furthermore, as with the flow samples,
there is a problem with common support, and the median bias diagnostic is often
unfavourable.
50 For each individual in the pilot group, the difference between their characteristics
and those of the matched and unmatched comparison groups is calculated. The
median bias is then the median value of the bias found between the characteristics
of these two samples: if the median bias is greater (in absolute terms) for the
treatment group compared to the matched comparison group (i.e. after matching)
than it was between the treatment group compared to the unmatched
comparison group (i.e. the raw difference), then it is said that the median bias
has increased.
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J.3 Conclusions from the tests for unobserved differences
This appendix has presented descriptive data from a period of time before the LPPs
began, together with the results of a formal test for unobserved differences
(between the characteristics of the pilot and comparison districts, or between the
characteristics of the lone parents living in these pilot and comparison districts). Such
a test is equivalent to testing for the impact of a non-existent policy using the same
treatment and comparison groups that are to be used in the impact evaluation of the
true pilots.
As can be seen from the Tables, at least some of these tests find significant
unobserved differences between pilot and comparison districts: in general, they
show that lone parents living in the pilot districts had consistently worse labour
market outcomes than apparently comparable lone parents living in the comparison
districts. If an evaluation of the LPPs were to be carried out using OLS, FILM or PSM
techniques, this difference in labour market outcomes (due to unobserved
characteristics) would be attributed to the pilots, such that any estimate would
understate the impact of the LPPs on labour market outcomes.
This is the reason why a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator is used to estimate
the impact of the LPPs: although not all of the tests indicate unobserved differences,
enough of them do to undermine confidence that all local-area effects are captured
by the set of explanatory/matching variables outlined in Box J.1 above. Chapter 5,
therefore, presents these difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the
LPPs.51
51 Note that it was decided to use the smaller set of explanatory variables in the
main analysis.




Mean outcomes and sample
sizes
These tables show mean outcomes and sample sizes for the pilot and comparison
groups – by phase, and for the stock and flow samples separately.
Table K.1 Average level of benefit outcome, flow sample
Per cent off Level for
benefit after comparison Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group
months group (all phases) (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3)
3 0.071 0.052 0.044 0.063 0.043
6 0.122 0.094 0.082 0.109 0.081
9 0.164 0.127 0.112 0.145 0.114
12 0.196 0.152 0.136 0.171 0.147
Table K.2 Average level of work outcome, flow sample
Per cent in Level for
work after comparison Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group
months group (all phases) (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3)
3 0.228 0.202 0.178 0.221 0.213
6 0.241 0.208 0.186 0.233 0.256
9 0.243 0.200 0.191 0.222 n/a
12 0.258 0.201 n/a n/a n/a
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Table K.3 Sample sizes, flow sample (benefit outcome)
Comparison Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group
group (all phases) (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3)
3 109,163 38,560 14,480 16,928 7,152
6 109,163 38,560 14,480 16,928 7,152
9 92,187 28,254 12,372 12,354 3,528
12 77,994 18,808 10,316 8,281 211
Table K.4 Sample sizes, flow sample (work outcome)
Comparison Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group Pilot group
group (all phases) (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3)
3 92,187 28,254 12,372 12,354 3,528
6 77,994 18,808 10,316 8,281 211
9 56,859 10,989 7,773 3,216 n/a
12 44,867 5,542 n/a n/a n/a
Table K.5 Average level of benefit outcomes, stock sample
Per cent off Comparison Comparison Comparison Pilot Pilot Pilot
benefit after group group group group group group
months (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3) (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3)
3 0.040 0.043 0.034 0.027 0.036 0.022
6 0.072 0.076 0.069 0.044 0.063 0.045
9 0.114 0.107 0.102 0.075 0.090 0.068
12 0.137 0.133 0.130 0.098 0.113 0.092
15 0.162 0.159 n/a 0.117 0.138 n/a
18 0.180 n/a n/a 0.132 n/a n/a
21 0.207 n/a n/a 0.154 n/a n/a
24 0.223 n/a n/a 0.171 n/a n/a
Sample size 299,468 292,343 285,132 42,374 77,290 71,705
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Table K.6 Average level of work outcomes, stock sample
Per cent in Comparison Comparison Comparison Pilot Pilot Pilot
work after group group group group group group
months (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3) (Phase 1) (Phase 2) (Phase 3)
3 0.139 0.141 0.141 0.119 0.129 0.126
6 0.155 0.156 0.153 0.129 0.142 0.134
9 0.171 0.168 n/a 0.141 0.151 n/a
12 0.181 0.178 n/a 0.150 0.160 n/a
15 0.196 n/a n/a 0.158 n/a n/a
18 0.207 n/a n/a 0.167 n/a n/a
Sample size 299,468 292,343 285,132 42,374 77,290 71,705
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Appendix L
Impact estimates for different
groups of lone parents
Table L.1 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent off benefit, by
gender (ppts)
Per cent off benefit after months Female Male
Flow sample, all phases
3 -0.20 (0.19) 0.21 (0.62)
6 0.08 (0.26) 0.14 (0.82)
9 0.28 (0.33) 0.12 (1.03)
12 0.19 (0.42) 1.01 (1.27)
Sample size1 35,682 2,878
Stock sample, phase 1
3 0.14 (0.15) -0.03 (0.60)
6 0.03 (0.19) -0.58 (0.79)
9 0.22 (0.24) -0.65 (0.98)
12 0.59 (0.26)** -0.70 (1.06)
15 0.54 (0.27)** -1.11 (1.13)
18 0.83 (0.29)*** -0.73 (1.18)
21 0.93 (0.30)*** -0.20 (1.25)
24 1.27 (0.31)*** -0.09 (1.28)
Sample size 40,256 2,118
Continued
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Table L.1 Continued
Per cent off benefit after months Female Male
Stock sample, phase 2
3 0.08 (0.11) -0.32 (0.45)
6 0.03 (0.15) -0.62 (0.59)
9 0.20 (0.18) -0.69 (0.71)
12 0.31 (0.19) -0.87 (0.78)
15 0.71 (0.21)*** -0.87 (0.83)
Sample size 73,080 4,210
Stock sample, phase 3
3 0.48 (0.12)*** -0.06 (0.47)
6 0.69 (0.16)*** 0.24 (0.63)
9 1.25 (0.19)*** -0.04 (0.77)
12 1.24 (0.21)*** 0.84 (0.84)
Sample size 68,304 3,401
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
1 Note that the sample size quoted here is for the flow sample at 91 days. This figure will
necessarily decrease over time, although there is no reason to expect that the relative sizes of the
different categories will alter.
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Table L.2 Estimated impact of the LPPs on per cent in work, by
gender (ppts)
Per cent in work after months Female Male
Flow sample, all phases
3 0.16 (0.21) 0.76 (0.65)
6 0.60 (0.30)** 0.75 (0.91)
9 0.81 (0.43)* -0.29 (1.25)
12 0.38 (0.65) -0.71 (1.84)
Sample size1 26,102 2,152
Stock sample, phase 1
3 0.22 (0.17) 0.08 (0.72)
6 0.26 (0.20) 0.21 (0.83)
9 0.21 (0.22) 0.29 (0.91)
12 0.26 (0.23) -0.74 (0.97)
15 0.74 (0.26)*** -0.32 (1.06)
18 0.98 (0.27)*** 0.11 (1.11)
Sample size 40,256 2,118
Stock sample, phase 2
3 0.25 (0.12)** -0.11 (0.50)
6 0.39 (0.15)*** -0.43 (0.59)
9 0.39 (0.16)** -0.34 (0.64)
12 0.63 (0.17)*** 0.32 (0.69)
Sample size 73,080 4,210
Stock sample, phase 3
3 0.78 (0.13)*** 0.01 (0.54)
6 1.16 (0.15)*** 0.37 (0.63)
Sample size 68,304 3,401
Note: authors’ calculations based on data and samples described in the text.
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors:
* = significant at ten per cent level, ** = significant at five per cent level, *** = significant at one
per cent level.
Results are presented in percentage points (ppts), so an estimate result of -0.16 means -0.16
ppts, not - 16ppts.
1 Note that the sample size quoted here is for the flow sample at 91 days. This figure will
necessarily decrease over time, although there is no reason to expect that the relative sizes of the
different categories will alter.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Work and benefit outcomes
for the stock and the flow
This appendix gives an overview of the differences between the lone parents in the
pilot and comparison districts by comparing the average outcomes (whether off
benefit or in work) in the pilot and comparison districts, without adjusting for any
characteristics of the individuals or districts. It does this both for the period before
and then after the introduction of the lone parent pilots.
M.1 Lone parents potentially eligible to the hypothetical
policy that began 1 April 2002
The following four figures show the proportions of the stock and flow samples that
are in work or have moved off benefits at various points in time. In these figures, time
is measured in months relative to the date on which lone parents first became
eligible for the hypothetical policy (for the stock, this is always equal to 1 April 2002;
for the flow, this will vary across the inflow window, i.e. between 1 April 2002 and
30 September 2003). The figures show that:
• Individuals in pilot districts are slower to leave benefits and spend less time in
work than those in comparison districts.
• Individuals in the flow sample leave benefits more quickly and spend more time
in work than those in the stock sample.
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• Two years before first becoming eligible for the hypothetical policy (usually 12
months before they started the relevant Income Support (IS)/Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA) claim), around a third of individuals in the flow sample are
recorded as being in work52, and around a third are claiming benefits. At the
same point in time, around 15 per cent of individuals in the stock sample are
recorded as being in work, and around 85 per cent are claiming benefits.
• On the date that individuals first become eligible for the hypothetical policy,
around 15 per cent of the samples (both flow and stock) are recorded as being
in work by the HMRC data in the WPLS. Although it is possible to be both in
work and receiving IS, this proportion seems rather high.
• After 24 months, almost a quarter of the flow sample has left benefits, compared
to less than a fifth of the stock sample; a similar proportion are recorded as
being in work.
• There is a small discontinuity in the work outcomes of the stock samples in
months -13 to -12 and months 12-13: these correspond to March-April 2001
and March-April 2003, and are due to the fact that work spells with uncertain
start or end dates have these dates set to 6 April or 5 April respectively.
Figure M.1 Benefit outcomes, flow sample
52 Some of the problems associated with using the data from Her Majesty’s Revenue
and Customs (HMRC) in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) as a
measure of being in work are discussed in Appendices C and D.
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Figure M.2 Work outcomes, flow sample
Figure M.3 Benefit outcomes, stock sample
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Figure M.4 Work outcomes, stock sample
M.2 Lone parents potentially eligible to the actual lone
parent pilots
The next figures illustrate the proportions of potentially eligible lone parents in the
stock and flow samples who are in work or have left benefits at various points in
time, measured relative to the date at which they became potentially eligible for In-
Work Credit (IWC) (for the stock, this is always equal to the date that the pilots
started in the lone parent’s home district; for the flow, this could be any date during
the inflow window)
Because separate impacts are estimated for each phase of the lone parent pilots
(LPPs), it is necessary to define three different comparison stock samples (shown in
three different graphs): one comprising lone parents who would have been
potentially eligible for the pilots (had they lived in one of the pilot districts) on the
date the Phase 1 pilots were introduced (1 April 2004); one comprising those who
would have been potentially eligible on 24 October 2004 (Phase 2); and one
comprising those who would have been potentially eligible on 1 April 2005 (Phase
3). Individuals are permitted to appear in more than one of these comparison
samples (and frequently do so).
The key findings of these figures for the period after the pilots began are discussed
in 6.1.1. Note also that there is a small discontinuity in the work outcomes in March-
April 2003: this appears as months -13 to -12 for the stock in Phase 1, and months
-20 to -19 for the stock in Phase 2. The discontinuity is due to the fact that work spells
with uncertain start or end dates have these dates set to 6 April or 5 April
respectively.
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Figure M.5 Benefit outcomes after the pilots have started, flow
sample
Figure M.6 Work outcomes after the pilots have started, flow
sample
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Figure M.7 Benefit outcomes after the pilots have started, stock
sample
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Figure M.8 Work outcomes after the pilots have started, stock
sample







This appendix shows graphically labour market outcomes in the pilot and comparison
districts, both before and after the pilots began. This is equivalent to an unadjusted
difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis and is the natural first step before
implementing the full DiD estimate. Of course, some of these changes may be due to
the characteristics of lone parents who were potentially eligible in the different
districts and over time, and these effects need to be removed before one can identify
the true impact of the pilots.
N.1 The stock sample
Below, one graph is shown for the stock sample in each Phase. Each graph shows
the proportion of the particular sample of lone parents who have left benefit (or
started work) at various points in time.
Four series are shown on each graph, all with the same outcome measure (whether
off benefit, or whether in work) but for different groups of lone parents. The four
groups are:
(i) lone parents who live in a pilot district and who were potentially eligible for
the Lone parent pilots (LPPs) on their first day of operation;
(ii) lone parents who live in a comparison district who would have been potentially
eligible for the LPPs on their first day of operation had they gone live nationwide
on the day they went live in the Phase under consideration (that Phase 1
started on 1 April 2004, Phase 2 on 1 October 2004 and Phase 3 on 4 April
2005);
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(iii) lone parents who live in a pilot district and who would have been potentially
eligible for the LPPs on their first day of operation, had they begun on 1 April
2002;
(iv) lone parents who live in a comparison district who would have been potentially
eligible for the LPPs on their first day of operation had they gone live nationwide
on 1 April 2002.
These are the four groups of lone parents that one needs to be able to implement a
DiD estimate of the impact of the LPPs.53
Figures N.1 and N.2 show that both benefit and work outcomes were worse in
districts comprising the three Phases of the LPPs than they were in the comparison
districts. In terms of benefit receipt, it is clear that outcomes after the pilots were
introduced are little different to those in the same districts before the pilots were
introduced. In terms of work outcomes, there appear to be differences in the early
months after the introduction of the LPPs that disappear over time: this is clearest
from the graph showing the Phase 1 outcomes. But the same appears to be true for
the comparison districts, so these Figures present no striking visual evidence that the
lone parent pilots affected labour market outcomes for the stock of potentially
eligible lone parents.
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53 Tables showing the mean outcomes and sample sizes for the pilot and comparison
groups – by phase, and for the stock and flow samples separately – can be
found in Appendix K. They indicate that sample sizes are larger for the stock
samples than for the flow samples; Phase 2 is the largest phase, followed by
Phase 1, then Phase 3; for the flow sample, sample sizes are lower for the
outcomes measured after longer periods of time because individuals in the flow
sample became potentially eligible to the pilots on different days, while all
outcomes are censored on the same day (31 March 2006 for benefits, and
30 September 2005 for work): this is not the case for the stock samples.
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Figure N.1 Whether off benefit, stock samples
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Figure N.2 Whether in work (as recorded by WPLS), stock samples
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N.2 The flow sample
The impact of the LPPs on the flow sample can be analysed in a similar way. However,
the figures that follow are more complicated than Figures N.1 and N.2 because they
distinguish between different cohorts of lone parents who enter the flow sample,
where a cohort is defined according to the month during which a lone parent first
became potentially eligible to the LPPs (by contrast, all lone parents in the stock
sample by definition became potentially eligible to the LPPs on the same day).
Figures N.3 to N.8 show the proportion of lone parents who have left benefit or who
are in work a set number of months after first becoming potentially eligible for the
pilots (after six, nine or 12 months), for four different groups of lone parents. Just as
in Figures N.1 and N.2, these four groups are:
(i) lone parents who live in a pilot district and who became potentially eligible for
the LPPs after their first day of operation;
(ii) lone parents who live in a comparison district who would have become
potentially eligible for the LPPs after their first day of operation, had they gone
live nationwide on the day they went live in the Phase under consideration;
(iii) lone parents who live in a pilot district and who would have become potentially
eligible for the LPPs after their first day of operation, had they begun on
1 April 2002;
(iv) lone parents who live in a comparison district who would have become
potentially eligible for the LPPs after their first day of operation, had they gone
live nationwide on 1 April 2002.
Again, these are the four groups of lone parents that one needs to implement a DiD
estimate of the impact of the lone parent pilots.54
Unlike Figures N.1 and N.2, the figures show the average outcome for different
cohorts of lone parents, where a cohort is defined by the month in which the claim
for IS becomes potentially eligible for the LPPs. The horizontal gap in each line
represents those cohorts of lone parents whose claim for Income Support (IS)
reached 12 months duration before the LPPs began in their district, but who were
exposed to the LPPs at some point before the labour market outcome displayed in
the graph was measured (for the purposes of these graphs, it is assumed that
hypothetical LPPs began in the comparison districts in April 2004).
In Figures N.3 to N.8, a visual assessment of the presence of an impact of the LPPs
using a DiD methodology involves comparing the line for each pilot district before
the horizontal gap in outcomes with the line for the comparison district before the
horizontal gap in outcomes, with the same two lines after the horizontal gap: if the
distance between these two lines has changed in any way, this is indicative of an
identifiable impact of the LPPs.
54 Sample sizes are given in Appendix K.
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Unlike the graphs for the stock sample, there is a great deal of variation in the
proportion of the flow samples that are claiming benefits from month to month,
both because there is genuine seasonality and because the number of lone parents
in each cohort is small: this makes the task of visually assessing the presence of an
impact (of the LPPs) more difficult. But it is clear that more lone parents are on
benefits in the pilot districts than in the comparison districts prior to the introduction
of the LPPs: this difference does not seem to increase or decrease following their
launch, indicating that the raw (unadjusted) impact of the LPPs on benefit outcomes
seems to be negligible. The pre-pilot differences (between pilot and comparison
districts) in employment outcomes, though, are less marked. Once the LPPs are
introduced, it appears that more individuals in both the pilot and comparison
districts move into work, but, if anything, the increase is greater for individuals in the
comparison district, implying that the raw (unadjusted) impact of the LPPs on
employment outcomes is negative.
Figure N.3 Whether off benefit (six months after first becoming
potentially eligible to the lone parent pilots), flow
sample
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Figure N.4 Flow, whether off benefit (nine months)
Figure N.5 Flow, whether off benefit (12 months)
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Figure N.6 Flow, whether in work (six months)
Figure N.7 Flow, whether in work (nine months)
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Figure N.8 Flow, whether in work (12 months)
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